Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
Nasa Space Shuttle Challenger · On January 28, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members
Event
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- Event fatalities
- 7 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- Occupants
- 7
- Survivors
- Unknown
- InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Government
Space Shuttle Challenger
- Aircraft type
- Space SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- Unknown
- Operator
- Nasa
- Onboard fatalities
- 7
- Route
- From not recordedTo not recorded
Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.
From the Wikipedia article
On January 28, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members. The spacecraft disintegrated about 46000 ft above the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 16:39:13 UTC (11:39:13 a.m. EST, local time at the launch site). It was the first fatal accident involving an American spacecraft while in flight.
The mission, designated STS-51-L, was the 10th flight for the orbiter and the 25th flight of the NASA's Space Shuttle program. The crew was scheduled to deploy a commercial communications satellite and study Halley's Comet while they were in orbit, in addition to taking schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe into space under the Teacher in Space Project. This latter task resulted in a higher-than-usual media interest in and coverage of the mission, and the launch and subsequent disaster were seen live in many schools across the United States.
The cause of the disaster was the failure of the primary and secondary O-ring seals in a joint in the right Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). The record-low temperatures on the morning of the launch had stiffened the rubber O-rings, reducing their ability to seal the joints. Shortly after liftoff the seals were breached, and hot pressurized gas from within the SRB leaked through the joint and burned through the aft attachment strut connecting it to the external propellant tank (ET), then into the tank itself. The collapse of the ET's internal structures and the rotation of the SRB that followed propelled the shuttle stack, traveling at a speed of Mach 1.92, into a direction that allowed aerodynamic forces to tear the orbiter apart. Both SRBs detached from the now-destroyed ET and continued to fly uncontrollably until the range safety officer (RSO) sent a signal to destroy them.
The crew compartment containing human remains, and many other fragments from the shuttle, were recovered from the ocean floor after a three-month search and recovery operation. The exact timing of the deaths of the crew is not known, but several crew members are thought to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. The orbiter had no escape system, and the impact of the crew compartment at terminal velocity with the ocean surface was too violent to be survivable.
The disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in the Space Shuttle program. President Ronald Reagan created the Rogers Commission to investigate the accident. The commission criticized NASA's organizational culture and decision-making processes that had contributed to the accident. Test data since 1977 had demonstrated a potentially catastrophic flaw in the SRBs' O-rings, but neither NASA nor SRB manufacturer Morton Thiokol had addressed this known defect. NASA managers also disregarded engineers' warnings about the dangers of launching in low temperatures and did not report these technical concerns to their superiors.
As a result of this disaster, NASA established the Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, and arranged for deployment of commercial satellites from expendable launch vehicles, rather than from a crewed orbiter. The construction of a new Space Shuttle orbiter, was approved in 1987 to replace Challenger, and the new orbiter first flew in 1992. Subsequent missions were launched with redesigned SRBs and their crews wore pressurized suits during ascent and reentry. In February 2003 the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated during re-entry. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded that NASA had failed to learn lessons from the Challenger disaster, which resulted in the second disaster.
Investigation and cause
Cause and time of death
The crew cabin, which was made of reinforced aluminum, separated in one piece from the rest of the orbiter. It then traveled in a ballistic arc, reaching an apogee of 65000 ft approximately 25 seconds after the explosion. At the time of separation, the maximum acceleration is estimated to have been between 12 and 20 times that of gravity (g). Within two seconds it had dropped below 4 g, and within ten seconds the cabin was in free fall. The forces involved at this stage were probably insufficient to cause major injury to the crew.
At least some of the crew were alive and conscious after the breakup, as Personal Egress Air Packs (PEAPs) were activated for Smith and two unidentified crewmembers, but not for Scobee. The PEAPs were not intended for in-flight use, and the astronauts never trained with them for an in-flight emergency. The location of Smith's activation switch, on the back side of his seat, indicated that either Resnik or Onizuka likely activated it for him. Investigators found their remaining unused air supply consistent with the expected consumption during the post-breakup trajectory.
While analyzing the wreckage, investigators discovered that several electrical system switches on Smith's right-hand panel had been moved from their usual launch positions. The switches had lever locks on top of them that must be pulled out before the switch could be moved. Later tests established that neither the force of the explosion nor the impact with the ocean could have moved them, indicating that Smith made the switch changes, presumably in a futile attempt to restore electrical power to the cockpit after the crew cabin detached from the rest of the orbiter.
On July 28, 1986, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight, former astronaut Richard H. Truly, released a report on the deaths of the crew from physician and Skylab 2 astronaut Joseph P. Kerwin:
Pressurization could have enabled consciousness for the entire fall until impact. The crew cabin hit the ocean surface at 207 mph approximately 2 minutes and 45 seconds after breakup. The estimated deceleration was, far exceeding structural limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels. The mid-deck floor had not suffered buckling or tearing, as would result from a rapid decompression, but stowed equipment showed damage consistent with decompression, and debris was embedded between the two forward windows that may have caused a loss of pressure. Impact damage to the crew cabin was severe enough that it could not be determined whether the crew cabin had previously been damaged enough to lose pressurization.
Text from the Wikipedia article “Space Shuttle Challenger disaster” (revision 1372668910, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article
Sources
Wikipedia article: Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
- Revision
- 1372668910 · 2026-09-01 · retrieved 2026-09-18
- Wikidata
- Q858145
- Licence
- Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
Where each value comes from
- Record
- Wikipedia article "Space Shuttle Challenger disaster" (page 403717, revision 1372668910)
- Date
- Wikipedia article text, read with AI assistance: date
- Place and country
- Wikipedia article text, read with AI assistance: site
- Map position
- Wikipedia article coordinates
- Aircraft, operator and route
- Wikipedia article text, read with AI assistance: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
- Operation
- operator named as a government agency in the infobox
- Fatalities
- Wikipedia article text, read with AI assistance: total_fatalities
- Ground fatalities
- not stated in the Wikipedia infobox
- Summary
- Wikipedia article lead
Source notes (1)
- Wikipedia · Facts from the Wikipedia article's infobox and coordinates, not checked against an investigation report. Independent review pending.