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ValuJet Flight 592

11 May 1996 · Florida Everglades, Miami-Dade County, Florida, US

Valujet Airlines Douglas DC-9-32 · In-flight cargo fire leading to loss of control

From Miami International Airport (MIA) to Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL)

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Event

NTSB case
DCA96MA054
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
Event fatalities
110 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
Occupants
110
Survivors
0
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
0 serious · 0 minor (NTSB)
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Douglas DC-9-32

Flight
J7592
Aircraft type
Douglas DC-9
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N904VJ
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Miami International Airport (MIA), Miami, FLTo Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, GA
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · climb to cruise
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Fire
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

  • Cargo/baggage › Improper
  • Company/operator management › Maintenance, inadequate
  • Faa(organization) › Insufficient standards/requirements
  • Fire extinguisher, cargo › Not installed
  • Hazardous material › Improper
  • Other person › Procedure inadequate
  • Smoke detector(s) › Not installed

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

ValuJet Flight 592 was a regularly scheduled flight from Miami to Atlanta in the United States. On May 11, 1996, the McDonnell Douglas DC-9 operating the route crashed into the Florida Everglades about 10 minutes after departing Miami due to a fire in the cargo compartment. The fire was caused by mislabeled and improperly stored chemical oxygen generators. All 110 people on board were killed.

ValuJet, a low-cost carrier, already had a poor safety record before the crash, and the incident brought widespread attention to the airline's problems. Its fleet was grounded for several months after the crash. When operations resumed, the airline was unable to attract as many customers as it had before the deadly crash. The airline acquired AirTran Airways in 1997 but the lingering damage to the ValuJet brand led its executives to assume the AirTran name. It is the deadliest aviation accident in Florida history As of 2026.

Background

ValuJet Airlines was founded in 1992 and was known for its aggressive cost-cutting measures. Many of the airline's planes were purchased in used condition from other airlines, and little training was provided to workers and contractors who were hired for maintenance and other services. ValuJet quickly developed a reputation for a lackluster safety record. In 1995, the United States military refused the airline's bid to fly its personnel due to safety concerns, and some officials at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) wanted the airline grounded.

In 1986, an American Trans Air McDonnell Douglas DC-10 being serviced at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport was destroyed on the ground by a fire caused by chemical oxygen generators. On February 3, 1988, aboard American Airlines Flight 132, a fire began in the cargo hold of the McDonnell Douglas MD-83 while the plane was in flight, caused by hazardous materials (primarily hydrogen peroxide); in that case the crew landed the aircraft safely. After Flight 132, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommended to the FAA that all class D cargo holds be fitted with smoke detectors and fire-suppression systems. The FAA declined to implement the recommendation.

Accident

On the afternoon of May 11, 1996, Flight 592 left Gate G2 in Miami after a delay of one hour and four minutes because of electrical problems. There were 110 people on board: 105 passengers, mainly from Florida and Georgia, and a crew of two pilots and three flight attendants. At 2:04 p.m. EDT, the DC-9 departed from Runway 9L (now Runway 8R) and began a normal climb.

At 2:10 p.m., the passengers began to smell smoke. At the same time, the pilots heard a loud bang in their headsets and noticed that the plane was losing electrical power. The sag in electrical power and the banging sound were eventually determined to be the result of an explosion of a tire in the cargo hold. Seconds later, a flight attendant entered the cockpit and informed the flight crew of a fire in the passenger cabin. Passengers' shouts of "fire, fire, fire" were recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) when the cockpit door was opened. ValuJet's flight-attendant training manual stated that the cockpit door should normally not be opened when smoke or other harmful gases might be present in the cabin. However, by this time the intercom was no longer functional and there was no other way to alert the pilots. The flight data recorder (FDR) indicated a progressive failure of the DC-9's electrical and flight control systems resulting from the spreading fire.

Kubeck and Hazen immediately asked air traffic control to return to Miami and were given instructions for a return to the airport. One minute later, Hazen requested the nearest available airport. Kubeck began to turn the plane left in preparation for the return to Miami.

Flight 592 disappeared from radar when it crashed at 2:13:42 p.m., about ten minutes after takeoff.

Eyewitnesses watched as the plane banked sharply, rolled onto its side and nosedived into the Francis S. Taylor Wildlife Management Area in the Everglades, a few miles west of Miami, at a speed in excess of 507 mph. According to the NTSB's report, two witnesses fishing nearby testified that "they saw a low-flying airplane in a steep right bank. According to these witnesses, as the right bank angle increased, the nose of the airplane dropped and continued downward. The airplane struck the ground in a nearly vertical attitude." They reported seeing no external damage nor any sign of fire or smoke other than the engine exhaust. A group of sightseers in a small private plane also witnessed the crash and provided a nearly identical account, stating that Flight 592 seemed to "disappear" after hitting the swamp and that they could see nothing but scattered small debris, part of an engine and a large pool of jet fuel near the crash site.

Examination of debris suggested that the fire had burned through the floorboards in the cabin, resulting in structural failure and damage to the hydraulic cables underneath the instrument panels. This likely rendered the plane uncontrollable; the flight data recorder showed Kubeck lost control of the plane less than 10 seconds before impact. The NTSB report on the accident stated that "the Safety Board cannot rule out the possibility that the flightcrew was incapacitated by smoke or heat in the cockpit during the last 7 seconds of the flight." Interruptions in the cockpit voice recorder occurred on two occasions, one of which was one minute and 12 seconds in length. The aircraft hit the water at 2:13:42 p.m. EDT, about 10 minutes after takeoff. The impact site was on the eastern edge of Florida Water Conservation Area 3B, between two levees, in an area known as the L-67 Pocket.

All on board were killed in the crash. Recovery of the aircraft and victims was severely complicated by the location of the crash. The nearest road of any kind was more than a quarter of a mile (400 m) away from the crash scene, and the location of the crash itself was a deep-water marsh with a floor of solid limestone. The aircraft was destroyed on impact, with no large pieces of the fuselage remaining. Sawgrass, alligators and risk of bacterial infection from cuts plagued searchers involved in the recovery effort.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

At the end of a 15-month investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the fire had developed in a cargo compartment below the passenger cabin. The cargo compartment was of a Class D design, in which fire suppression is accomplished by sealing the hold from outside air. Any fire in such an airtight compartment would quickly exhaust all available oxidizers and then extinguish itself. As the fire suppression can be accomplished without any intervention by the crew, such holds are not equipped with smoke detectors.

The NTSB determined that just before takeoff, 144 expired chemical oxygen generators, each slightly larger than the size of a tennis-ball can, had been placed in the cargo compartment in five boxes marked COMAT (company material) by ValuJet's maintenance contractor SabreTech. This violated Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations forbidding the transport of hazardous materials in passenger-aircraft cargo holds. Failure to cover the generators' firing pins with the prescribed plastic caps made accidental activation much more likely. The investigation revealed that rather than covering the pins, maintenance personnel simply cut the cords attached to the pins or applied duct tape around the cans, and consumer-grade adhesive tape was also used to secure the ends. SabreTech employees indicated on the cargo manifest that the "oxy canisters", which were loosely packed in boxes that were each sealed with tape and bubble wrap, were "empty." ValuJet workers then loaded the boxes in the cargo hold in the mistaken belief that the devices were simply empty canisters that would be safe and legal to transport on a passenger aircraft.

Chemical oxygen generators, when activated, produce oxygen for passengers if the plane suffers a decompression. However, they also produce a great quantity of heat because of the exothermic nature of the chemical reaction involved. Therefore, not only could the heat and generated oxygen start a fire, but the oxygen could also keep the fire burning.

Investigators determined that one of the oxygen generators was likely triggered when the plane experienced a slight jolt while taxiing. As the aircraft taxied and took off, the generator began releasing heat that caused other canisters to activate. Each activation created more heat, which rapidly caused all of the generators to activate. The intense heat ignited a fire in the other materials in the cargo hold. The fire was worsened by the presence of two main aircraft tires, one of them mounted on a main wheel, and a nose tire and wheel that were also included in the list of materials shipped as COMAT.

Laboratory testing showed that canisters of the same type could heat nearby materials up to 500 F. The oxygen from the generators fed the resulting fire in the cargo hold without any need for outside air, defeating the cargo hold's airtight design. A pop and jolt heard on the cockpit voice recording and correlated with a brief and dramatic spike in the altimeter reading in the flight data recording were attributed to the sudden cabin-pressure change caused by one of the wheels in the cargo hold exploding from the heat. Investigators also determined that in this process, the fire began to destroy control cables that ran to the back of the aircraft, which explained why the pilots began losing control before the plane crashed. The NTSB concluded that the aircraft was under positive control by the pilots until the time of the sharp right turn and dive immediately prior to impact.

Text from the Wikipedia article “ValuJet Flight 592” (revision 1363500548, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

NTSB narrative

The airplane crashed into the Everglades about 10 minutes after takeoff from Miami International Airport. Safety issues discussed in the Board's report include minimization of the hazards posed by fires in class D cargo compartments; equipment, training, and procedures for addressing in-flight smoke and fire aboard air carrier airplanes; guidance for handling of chemical oxygen generators and other hazardous aircraft components; SabreTech's and ValuJet's procedures for handling company materials and hazardous materials; ValuJet's oversight of its contract heavy maintenance facilities; FAA's oversight of ValuJet and ValuJet's contract maintenance facilities; FAA's and the Research and Special Programs Administration's (RSPA) hazardous materials program and undeclared hazardous materials in the U.S. mail; and ValuJet's procedures for boarding and accounting for lap children. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the FAA, RSPA, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Air Transport Association. (See NTSB Report AAR-97/06)

Probable cause

which resulted from a fire in the airplane's class D cargo compartment that was initiated by the actuation of one or more oxygen generators being improperly carried as cargo, were (1) the failure of SabreTech to properly prepare, package, and identify unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting them to ValuJet for carriage; (2) the failure of ValuJet to properly oversee its contract maintenance program to ensure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and hazardous materials requirements and practices; and (3) the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require smoke detection and fire suppression systems in class D cargo compartments. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FAA to adequately monitor ValuJet's heavy maintenance programs and responsibilities, including ValuJet's oversight of its contractors, and SabreTech's repair station certificate; the failure of the FAA to adequately respond to prior chemical oxygen generator fires with programs to address the potential hazards; and ValuJet's failure to ensure that both ValuJet and contract maintenance facility employees were aware of the carrier's 'no-carry' hazardous materials policy and had received appropriate hazardous materials training. (NTSB Report AAR-97/06)

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

Wikipedia article: ValuJet Flight 592
Article
ValuJet Flight 592
Revision
1363500548 · 2026-07-10 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q947452
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA96MA054
Event ID
20001208X05743
Case number
DCA96MA054
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "ValuJet Flight 592" (page 375120, revision 1363500548); merged with NTSB case DCA96MA054 (events / aircraft)
Date
NTSB record DCA96MA054: NTSB API eventDate, eventTimeUtc and eventTimeUtcOffsetHours (local date)
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA96MA054
Map position
Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route
NTSB record DCA96MA054: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
NTSB record DCA96MA054: operated under Part 121: Air Carrier
Fatalities
NTSB record DCA96MA054: NTSB API totalFatal
Ground fatalities
NTSB record DCA96MA054: NTSB API ongroundFatal
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
  • One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "ValuJet Flight 592" and NTSB case DCA96MA054, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, operator. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.