Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701

On October 14, 2004, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701, a Bombardier CRJ200 on a repositioning flight from Little Rock to Minneapolis, crashed while attempting an emergency approach to Jefferson City Memorial Airport in Missouri, United States. Both pilots, the only two people on board, were killed. The aircraft was originally scheduled to fly a passenger flight from Little Rock to Minneapolis earlier that day, but a mechanical issue forced the flight to be delayed. Since the aircraft was still needed for Pinnacle Airlines operations out of Minneapolis the next day, the airline elected to ferry the aircraft to Minneapolis. The two pilots on board made the aircraft climb to 41,000 ft, the maximum operating altitude of the CRJ200, but did not ensure a safe airspeed for the high altitude they were flying at. Due to the low energy state of the aircraft, it subsequently stalled and, due to interrupted airflow, both engines flamed out. The crew failed to execute the proper dual engine failure checklists and did not glide the aircraft to a suitable airport. The plane crashed in a residential area short of the runway and was destroyed.

The investigation, conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, found several factors that led to the accident. Investigators found that during the flight the crew had intentionally deviated from standard operating procedures, displayed unprofessional cockpit attitude, and aggressively maneuvered the aircraft. In particular, investigators discovered that Pinnacle Airlines flight crews had expressed curiosity in flying at the CRJ200's service ceiling and pilots who had done so informally called it the "410 club". Data from the flight recorders indicated that the crew did not anticipate the upset and improperly executed the checklist procedures. The crew did not effectively communicate with air traffic control about their emergency situation and did not fully discuss potential landing sites. Investigators also determined that the engines core locked during the accident sequence, which prevented the crew from restarting them, and the available documentation to the crew did not communicate the importance of preventing core lock.

Flight crew performance

Investigators determined that throughout the flight, the pilots displayed unprofessional behavior and poor airmanship, and intentionally deviated from standard operating procedures. The crew's abrupt pitch maneuvers during the departure and climb were not conducted for any operational or safety reason and likely placed the airplane outside of its certified flight envelope. Although the filed flight plan listed a cruising altitude of 33,000 ft, both pilots repeatedly expressed excitement about reaching 41,000 ft. Both pilots agreed to the decision to fly at 41,000 ft, and post-accident interviews indicated that there was a "sense of allure to some pilots" to cruise at the flight level as part of the "410 club". The NTSB concluded that the pilot's aggressive maneuvers and flight to 41,000 ft were made for personal reasons rather than operational reasons. They additionally noted how since the crew were flying a repositioning flight with no one else on board, the crew had an opportunity to aggressively maneuver the aircraft and push its limits.

FDR data revealed that the crew improperly managed the climb to 41,000 ft. Rather than start the climb at an airspeed of 250 kn like stated in the airline's manuals, the crew started the climb at 203 kn. Additionally, the crew conducted the climb with the autopilot set in vertical speed mode with a set rate-of-climb commanded instead of specifying an airspeed. The improper management of the climb resulted in the airspeed decaying to 163 kn by the time the aircraft leveled off at 41,000 ft. The aircraft was on the back side of the power curve; the available thrust at the altitude was insufficient to maintain the airspeed, necessitating an increasing AoA to hold the altitude, which resulted in increased induced-drag and an even lower airspeed.

When the aircraft stalled at 41,000 ft, the stick pusher attempted to force the aircraft's nose down three consecutive times. Each time, the crew overrode the stick pusher by pulling the control column back rather than letting the AoA decrease. The NTSB believed that the pilots were instinctively trying to maintain altitude, which was in line with the training they received from Pinnacle Airlines. In addition, both pilots had never faced a simulator exercise involving the stick pusher. After the engines flamed out, the crew quickly declared an emergency to ATC, but took over a minute to initiate the dual engine failure checklist. Flight recorder data then showed that the crew did not accelerate the aircraft to the speed required by the checklist, causing the restart attempts to fail. The NTSB determined that Captain Rhodes did not ensure First Officer Cesarz—who was the only one that had functioning instruments—properly accelerated the aircraft enough to make a windmill restart possible. Additionally, they concluded that Cesarz's limited flying experience made him reluctant to pitch the nose down enough to increase the airspeed to 300 kn.

At the time of the upset and engine failure, six airports were in gliding range of the aircraft: Jefferson City Memorial Airport; Waynesville Regional Airport; Floyd W. Jones Lebanon Airport; Lee C. Fine Memorial Airport; Springfield-Branson Regional Airport; and Rolla National Airport. Additionally, both crew members recognized from the start of the emergency that both engines had flamed out. However, it was only until fourteen minutes after the upset that the crew reported the dual engine failure to ATC, by which time only one airport—Lee C. Fine Memorial Airport—was still in range. The NTSB determined that Captain Rhodes knowingly gave inaccurate information to ATC, downplaying the severity of their emergency and demonstrating his reluctance to have their unprofessional behavior detected.

The NTSB concluded that the accident was the result of the crew, who "intentionally deviated from standard operating procedures and basic airmanship." They determined the crew displayed unprofessional tone and that their attitude was insufficient with the performance required to fly a regional jet. The comments the pilots made regarding the climb to 41,000 ft were considered "thrill-seeking" by the NTSB. They overall concluded that the flight crew's intentionally unprofessional behavior was causal to the accident and led directly to the upset.