BSAA Star Ariel disappearance

Investigation

A representative of the Chief Inspector of Accidents left for Bermuda on 18 January 1949.

It was revealed that there had been no bad weather, none of the weather reports indicating any abnormal conditions, and the chance of any marked clear air turbulence was almost nil. There were no clouds above 10000 ft over the whole of the aircraft's route.

However, although the weather was good, the day in question had suffered communication problems ranging from static to poor reception to complete blackouts lasting as much as 10 minutes which came and went, selectively affecting certain planes calling certain stations from different angles. The communication problem lasted almost exactly the entire time the Star Ariel would have been in flight, finally lifting around 13:07.

This was investigated, along with McPhee's switch over to Kingston frequency which was considered early, as he was still close to Bermuda at the time. It was considered possible that a distress transmission on that frequency might not have been heard, given the aircraft's distance from Kingston.

However, a BSAA representative in Kingston observed:

"It would appear that the aircraft should have made firm contact with MRX before requesting permission from Bermuda to change frequency. This was obviously not done as MRX never worked G-AGRE on this frequency at all. In addition I am convinced that G-AGRE did not ever transmit on this frequency of 6523 kc/s. even if Bermuda did give authority to change frequency which they could quite readily have done. This latter opinion is based on the fact that not only was MRX in Jamaica listening out on 6523 kc/s. but so also were New York, Miami, Nassau, Havana, and Bilbao and, so far as we are aware and from what definite information we have, none of these stations ever heard from G-AGRE on 6523 kc/s. Whilst it may have been possible for us not to hear G-AGRE owing to the bad reception Palisadoes [Kingston Aerodrome] was experiencing at the time of the requested QSY [change of frequency], it would seem most improbable for similar conditions to obtain with all those other stations listening out on that frequency."

Conclusions

On 21 December 1949 the report of the inquiry was issued by the Chief Inspector of Accidents, Air Commodore Vernon Brown, CB, OBE, MA, FRAeS. In it he stated that "through lack of evidence due to no wreckage having been found, the cause of the accident is unknown."

Brown said that there was no evidence of defect in, or failure of, any part of the aircraft before its departure from Bermuda. The all-up weight and the centre of gravity were within the prescribed limits; a daily inspection had been carried out; the pilot was experienced on the route; the radio officer was very experienced and also experienced on the route; good radio communications had been maintained with the aircraft up to and including reception of its last message; there were no weather complications, and a study of the weather reports have no reason to believe that the accident was caused by meteorological conditions. There was also no evidence of sabotage, though Brown said that the possibility of such could not be entirely eliminated.

It was accepted that radio communications were poor during the early afternoon and worsened between 16:00 and 17:00, but Brown said it seemed strange that no attempt was made by BSAA staff at Kingston to find out whether anything had been heard of the aircraft until 2 hours 28 minutes after its last radio transmission. Kingston also did not attempt to establish contact with the aircraft until 17:10 or inquire as to whether it had made contact with Nassau or New York or any other radio station.