Japan Air Lines Flight 2
Douglas DC-8 · Controlled flight into terrain on approach due to pilot error
From Tokyo Haneda International Airport (HND) to San Francisco International Airport (SFO)
Event
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Unknown
- Event fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- Occupants
- 107
- Survivors
- 107
- InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
- 0 serious · 0 minor (NTSB)
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Instrument Meteorological Cond
Douglas DC-8
- Flight
- JL2
- Aircraft type
- Douglas DC-8
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- JA8032
- Operator
- Japan Air Lines
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Tokyo Haneda International Airport (HND)To San Francisco International Airport (SFO)
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air carrier (scheduled international passenger service)
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Approach
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Controlled collision with ground/water
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Pilot in command › Failed to use or incorrectly used miscellaneous equipment
- Pilot in command › Improper IFR operation
Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.
From the Wikipedia article
Japan Air Lines Flight 2 was a scheduled passenger flight on November 22, 1968. The plane was a six-month-old Douglas DC-8-62 named Shiga (志賀), flying from Tokyo International Airport (Haneda) to San Francisco International Airport (SFO). Due to heavy fog and other factors, Captain Kohei Asoh crashed the plane near Coyote Point in the shallow waters of San Francisco Bay, two and a half miles short of the runway. All 107 people on board survived the accident without any injuries. Despite the abrupt ditching, and being immersed in salt-water, the aircraft was recovered, repaired, and returned to service.
Accident
Flight 2 was scheduled to depart Tokyo at 5 p.m. (08:00 UTC) on Friday, November 22 and land in San Francisco at 10:15 a.m. (17:15 UTC). Actual departure was delayed to 5:36 p.m. (08:36 UTC) due to required maintenance on the pilot's instrument panel, which was providing inconsistent altitude readings. The flight was conducted without incident over the next eight hours.
As it approached its destination, JAL002 was picked up by local radar in Oakland at 8:54 a.m. (16:54 UTC) when 169 nmi on the 257th radial from the Oakland Vortac and the aircraft was cleared for landing at SFO via a waypoint 21 mi west of the Woodside Vortac station at an altitude of 8000 ft. Oakland TRACON advised the pilots that local visibility at SFO was 3/4 mi and the runway visual range exceeded 6000 ft, recommending the flight to hold. Commanding pilot Captain Kohei Asoh attempted an automatic-coupled Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach due to the heavy fog, which he had never done before on a recorded DC-8-62 flight. JAL002 had started descending from its cruising altitude of 37000 ft at 8:59 a.m. (16:59 UTC), passing through 13000 ft approximately eleven minutes later, when Oakland TRACON provided an update on runway visual range at SFO, which had fallen to 3500 ft. JAL002 continued its descent as air traffic control was handed over to Bay TRACON while close to the Woodside Vortac; the pilot reported an altitude of 8000 ft at 9:12:54.3 a.m. (17:12:54.3 UTC), then 6500 ft at 9:14:11.3 a.m. (17:14:11.3 UTC).
Less than a minute later, Captain Asoh requested that "due to the weather at San Francisco, we'd like a long final [approach], rather than direct to the outer marker", which would put the aircraft 6 mi to the east of the original landing path marker and provide a straighter approach to the runway. Under the ILS approach, the autopilot and flight director would be used to control the aircraft's heading and altitude. At 9:16 a.m. (17:16 UTC), Bay TRACON instructed Asoh to descend to and maintain 4000 ft altitude and turn left to a heading of 040° while holding at an airspeed of 180 kn. Updates were made to the flight's heading and altitude in response to air traffic control, and the final approach was commanded at 9:20:44 a.m. when Bay TRACON instructed JAL002 to make a left turn and assume a heading of 280° as they passed through the localizer in accordance with the ILS approach. Once the localizer was captured, Asoh moved the autopilot selector from VOR LOC to ILS and slowed the plane to 160 kn in accordance with instructions from the ground; he used the radio direction indicator as the primary instrument for the approach rather than the glide slope deviation indicator, which was fluctuating at the time. In addition, because his pressure altimeter had been replaced prior to the start of the flight, Asoh did not trust its readings, especially since it continued to disagree with the copilot's instrument, indicating a brief climb each time the aircraft had leveled off during the flight.
The cloud ceiling was 300 ft and there was little contrast between the sky and the calm waters of the bay. As a result, during the final descent, the too-low altitude was not recognized in time to correct it before hitting the water. Asoh had set his minimum descent altitude alert to 211 ft; the alert was triggered by the radio altimeter, as the pressure altimeter was reading 300 ft at the time; as Asoh checked for runway lights, First Officer Hazen called out visual updates: "[we are] breaking out of the overcast — I cannot see the runway light — we are too low — pull up, pull up". Asoh later stated that he realized the plane was too low once he spotted the water after the plane broke through the fog with an air speed of 177 mi/hour. He grabbed the control stick to gain altitude and advanced the throttles in anticipation of having to abort the landing and perform a go-around, but the plane's main landing gear had already struck the water, first right then left, approximately 2+1/2 mi short of runway 28L. The plane touched down in the water at approximately 9:24:25 a.m. (1724:25 UTC). Passenger Walter Dunbar recalled "We came in alongside the mountains and went into thick fog. The next thing I knew, we were about one foot off the water. She hit, skipped twice, then nosed up."
An early report from the Coast Guard stated the aircraft came to rest upside down. In fact, the plane came to rest on the Bay floor in shallow water approximately 7 ft deep, leaving the forward exits above the waterline. The chief purser, Kazuo Hashimoto, felt there was no panic amongst passengers after landing, and tried to make an announcement with the public address (PA) system. Since the PA system had failed after the landing, he ended up shouting from the forward cabin for passengers to "Be quiet, the plane has reached the bottom of the sea. It will not sink. Do not worry, we are well-fixed for evacuation." The passengers and crew all evacuated the plane on lifeboats, which were towed by police and Coast Guard boats to the nearby Coyote Point Yacht Harbor. Asoh was the last to leave. Asoh returned to the plane after ensuring everyone was safely ashore to gather and return the passengers' personal belongings.
After the incident, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated it was the first successful ditching of a jetliner since the inauguration of jet service. The landing may have been assisted by the unusually high tide of 7 ft, compared with the typical water level of 4 ft, leading South San Francisco fire chief John Marchi to declare the ditching "a one-in-a-million shot" as the increased depth gave sufficient cushioning while being shallow enough that exit doors would remain above the water.
Investigation and cause
Investigation
Asoh was a veteran pilot who had flown with Japan Air Lines for 14 years in 1968, with roughly 10,000 hours of flight time, 1,000 of them on DC-8s. During World War II he served as a flight instructor for the Japanese military. His first officer, Joseph Hazen, had similar flight experience and served in the Marine Corps before flying for Air America from 1961 to 1968. Asoh had 1,062 hours of flight time in the DC-8, while Hazen had 18. After becoming familiarized with the DC-8-62 in April 1968, Asoh piloted approximately one round-trip from Tokyo to San Francisco and back via Honolulu per month, starting in July. At the time, Asoh stated (through a translator) that "the plane was fully automatic" and he couldn't "say what was wrong [to cause the water landing]" because he had been in contact with the control tower during the entire approach and was never informed he had deviated from the flight path.
According to the NTSB report, Asoh failed to follow the published Japan Air Lines procedures to perform an autopilot-controlled descent from the Woodside Vortac and subsequent automatic-coupled approach on ILS. Had the procedure been followed, the localizer first would be coupled, then the flight director/autopilot coupling system would permit the glide slope to be captured. According to his statement, Asoh did not set the autopilot for ILS capture until the aircraft had descended to an altitude of 2500 ft, when it was already below the required glide slope. In-cockpit instruments then should have been sufficient to warn the crew, more than three minutes before the water landing. Other JAL crews reported they were not trained in the use of the Sperry Flight Director System, resulting in revisions to the training program for flight crews. In addition, the language barrier between the commanding pilot and first officer could have been a contributing cause, as there was apparently insufficient "understanding, coordination, and confidence between crewmembers that the pilot flying the aircraft reacts to the other pilot's calls in a manner much the same as if he himself is looking through the other's eyes."
Text from the Wikipedia article “Japan Air Lines Flight 2” (revision 1374884691, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article
NTSB remarks
IMPROP APPLICATION OF PRO TO EXECUTE AUTO-COUPLED ILS APCH.LACK FAMIL,INFRQT OPNS FLT DIR-AUTO-PLT
NTSB's remark from its 1962–1981 archive, as recorded (abbreviated, at most 98 characters): the archive has no narrative
Sources
Wikipedia article: Japan Air Lines Flight 2
- Article
- Japan Air Lines Flight 2
- Revision
- 1374884691 · 2026-09-14 · retrieved 2026-09-18
- Wikidata
- Q4071388
- Licence
- Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record
- Event ID
- 19681122P028472
- Case number
- Unknown
- Dataset
- historical-pre1982
- Source SHA-256
- abe1a933b4b73583d61684309f7f0610c281e3c1de3537c6471bf2a98ba6481d
Where each value comes from
- Record
- Wikipedia article "Japan Air Lines Flight 2" (page 14369150, revision 1374884691); merged with NTSB case NTSB19681122P028472 (PRE1982 tblFirstHalf (one row per aircraft, grouped by date, place and time))
- Date
- NTSB record NTSB19681122P028472: PRE1982 DATE_OCCURRENCE
- Place and country
- Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record NTSB19681122P028472
- Map position
- Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
- Aircraft, operator and route
- NTSB record NTSB19681122P028472: PRE1982 REGIST_NO, ACFT_MAKE, ACFT_MODEL; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
- Operation
- NTSB record NTSB19681122P028472: operated under Part 121: Air carrier (scheduled intl passg service)
- Fatalities
- NTSB record NTSB19681122P028472: PRE1982 TOTAL_ABRD_FATAL of each aircraft, plus people on the ground and others outside the aircraft
- Ground fatalities
- NTSB record NTSB19681122P028472: events.inj_f_grnd
- Summary
- Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (4)
- One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "Japan Air Lines Flight 2" and NTSB case NTSB19681122P028472, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
- From NTSB's 1962-1981 archive (PRE1982), which holds at most a short remark (98 characters, abbreviated) instead of a narrative; the accident type, phase of flight, causes and conditions are NTSB's codes, decoded as the archive defines them.
- Reviewed means this record passed the site's consistency check, not that it was checked against a narrative or report - there is none to check against.
- The operation category is mapped from the archive's operator and operation codes and has not been reviewed.