Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311
Embraer EMB-120RT · Propeller malfunction due to control system design flaw leading to loss of control
From Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL) to Brunswick Golden Isles Airport (BQK)
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA91MA033
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- 23 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- Occupants
- 23
- Survivors
- 0
- InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
- 0 serious · 0 minor (NTSB)
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Charter & commuter
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Embraer EMB-120RT
- Flight
- EV2311 / DL2311
- Aircraft type
- Embraer EMB-120
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N270AS
- Operator
- Atlantic Southeast Airlines
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, GATo Brunswick Golden Isles Airport (BQK)
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Approach
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Destroyed
Cause areas
- Propeller system/accessories, prop control unit › Failure, partial
- Propeller system/accessories, prop control unit › Inadequate
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
From the Wikipedia article
Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311 was a regularly scheduled commuter flight in Georgia in the southeastern United States, from Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International Airport to Glynco Jetport (since renamed Brunswick Golden Isles Airport) in Brunswick on April 5, 1991.
The flight, operating a twin-turboprop Embraer EMB 120 Brasilia, crashed north of Brunswick while approaching the airport for landing. All 23 aboard were killed, including astronaut Sonny Carter and former U.S. Senator John Tower.
Four years later, another Embraer Brasilia of ASA crashed in the Georgia countryside in similar circumstances, with nine fatalities.
Flight crew
Captain Mark Friedline, aged 34, had been hired by Atlantic Southeast Airlines ten years earlier in May 1981, and was fully qualified to fly three different commercial aircraft, including the EMB-120. At the time of the accident, he had accumulated an estimated 11,724 total flying hours, of which 5,720 hours were in the EMB-120. Friedline had been involved in the development of the EMB-120, and its introduction to service in the United States, and was trained to fly the aircraft by the manufacturer. An inspector described his knowledge of aircraft systems as "extensive", and his pilot techniques as "excellent".
First Officer Hank Johnston, aged 36, was hired by Atlantic Southeast Airlines in June 1988, and was a qualified flight instructor. Because more than six months had passed since he had undergone an FAA medical inspection and been issued a first-class certificate, it automatically reverted to a second-class certificate, adequate for his duties as a first officer. At the time of the accident, Johnston had accumulated about 3,925 total flying hours, of which 2,795 hours were in the EMB-120.
Accident
On the morning of the accident, the captain and first officer arrived at the Dothan Regional Airport by taxi about 06:15 Eastern Standard Time. The taxi cab driver reported that the crew was in good spirits and readily engaged in conversation. The crew flew first to Atlanta, then performed a round trip to Montgomery, Alabama, before returning to Atlanta. After this round trip, the crew had a scheduled break for around two and a half hours, in which they were described as well-rested and talkative.
Flight 2311 was scheduled initially to be operated by N228AS, another EMB-120. This airplane experienced mechanical problems, so the flight was switched to N270AS. This aircraft had flown four times already on the day of the accident, with no reports of any problems. N270AS departed Atlanta, operating ASA Flight 2311, at 13:47, 23 minutes behind schedule.
Flight 2311 deviated slightly in its flight path to Brunswick to avoid poor weather. Just after 14:48, the flight crew acknowledged to the Jacksonville air route traffic control center that the airport was in sight, and Flight 2311 was subsequently cleared for a visual approach to Glynco Jetport on runway 7, which the flight crew acknowledged.
The last transmission received from Flight 2311 was to the ASA manager at the airport, who reported that the flight made an "in-range call" on the company radio frequency, and that the pilot gave no indication that the flight had any mechanical problems. Witnesses reported seeing the aircraft approaching the airport in visual meteorological conditions at a much lower than normal altitude. Several witnesses estimated that the aircraft flew over them at an altitude of 100 to 200 ft above the ground.
According to most of the interviewed witnesses, the airplane suddenly rolled to the left until the wings were perpendicular to the ground. The aircraft then descended in a nose-down attitude and disappeared from sight behind trees near the airport. One witness told investigators that they saw a puff of smoke emanate from the aircraft prior to or subsequent to the airplane rolling to the left. Others reported loud engine noises described as a squeal, whine, or an overspeeding or accelerating engine during the last moments of the flight, although they said that these noises seemed to have stopped, or at least faded before the aircraft impacted with flat ground two miles short of the runway.
One witness interviewed by the NTSB, a pilot driving on a road southwest of the airport, told investigators that he saw the airplane in normal flight at normal altitudes, and that he believed that the approach was not abnormal. The airplane completed a 180° turn from the downwind leg of the approach and continued the turn. He then saw the aircraft pitch slightly, before it rolled to the left until the wings were vertical. The airplane then turned nose-down and smashed into the ground. He saw no fire or smoke during the flight, and he believed both propellers were rotating.
There were 20 passengers on board, including former U.S. Senator John Tower from Texas (head of the Tower Commission for the Iran–Contra affair) and astronaut Manley "Sonny" Carter. All 23 passengers and crew died in the accident.
Investigation and cause
Investigation
An investigation carried out by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) initially determined that a malfunction of the flight control surfaces, including a rudder or ailerons hardover or asymmetric flaps, could not have caused the accident, after multiple pilots in simulators managed to keep the aircraft under control. Engine failure was also ruled out by detailed inspection of the two engines. The investigators found that the "circumstances of this accident indicate that a severe asymmetric thrust condition caused a left roll that led to loss of control of the airplane. The NTSB's investigation examined all the possible events that could have caused the loss of control. The powerplant and propeller examinations indicated that the engines were operating normally, but that a propeller system malfunction occurred", which allowed the left propeller's angles to be oriented nearly perpendicular to the direction of flight, resulting in insufficient thrust and higher drag on the left side.
The NTSB conducted a test flight in an EMB-120 with the left engine having the propeller control mechanism set to a similar mechanical condition, but blocking the propeller blades from moving below 22° to not endanger the flight crew. The flight crew was found to be unable to perceive any problem with the airplane until the propeller blade angle was between 24 and 26°. They stated that the airplane would have "become very difficult to control after the propeller reached the 22° stop, so the pilots of flight 2311 most likely did not notice a problem with the airplane until the propeller began to overspeed and roll control was affected." Thus, the flight crew would have been unable to declare an emergency, as the event was so sudden. The crashed aircraft's left engine propeller blades went to 3° instead of the commanded 79.2° for feathering.
The NTSB's final report, while acknowledging that Atlantic Southeast's practice of overworking pilots (the pilots only received an estimated 5 to 6 hours of sleep in violation of federal aviation regulations) played no direct part in the accident, still raised concerns that the airline, along with other commuter airline corporations, "scheduled reduced rest periods for about 60% of the layovers in its day-to-day operations. The NTSB believes that this practice is inconsistent with the level of safety intended by the regulations, which is to allow reduced rest periods as a contingency to a schedule disruption, and has the potential of adversely affecting pilot fitness and performance."
Probable cause
On April 28, 1992, the NTSB published its final accident report, including its determination of the cause of the accident:
Text from the Wikipedia article “Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311” (revision 1369051082, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article
NTSB narrative
WITNESSES REPORTED THAT THE AIRPLANE SUDDENLY TURNED OR ROLLED LEFT UNTIL THE WINGS WERE PERPENDICULAR TO THE GROUND. THE AIRPLANE THEN FELL IN A NOSE-DOWN ATTITUDE. EXAM OF THE LEFT PROP COMPONENTS INDICATED A BLADE ANGLE OF ABOUT 3 DEG, WHILE THE LEFT PROP CONTROL UNIT (PCU) BALLSCREW POSITION WAS CONSISTENT WITH A COMMANDED BLADE ANGLE OF 79.2 DEG. EXTREME WEAR ON THE PCU QUILL SPLINE TEETH, WHICH NORMALLY ENGAGED THE TITANIUM-NITRIDED SPLINES OF THE PROP TRANSFER TUBE, WAS FOUND. THE TITANIUM-NITRIDED SURFACE WAS MUCH HARDER AND ROUGHER THAN THE NITRIDED SURFACE OF THE QUILL. THEREFORE, THE TRANSFER TUBE SPLINES ACTED LIKE A FILE AND CAUSED ABNORMAL WEAR OF THE GEAR TEETH ON THE QUILL. WEAR OF THE QUILL WAS NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE CERTIFICATION OF THE PROPELLER SYSTEM.
Probable cause
THE LOSS OF CONTROL IN FLIGHT AS A RESULT OF A MALFUNCTION OF THE LEFT ENGINE PROPELLER CONTROL UNIT WHICH ALLOWED THE PROPELLER BLADE ANGLES TO GO BELOW THE FLIGHT IDLE POSITION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE DEFICIENT DESIGN OF THE PROPELLER CONTROL UNIT BY HAMILTON STANDARD AND THE APPROVAL OF THE DESIGN BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION. THE DESIGN DID NOT CORRECTLY EVALUATE THE FAILURE MODE THAT OCCURRED DURING THIS FLIGHT, WHICH RESULTED IN AN UNCOMMANDED AND UNCORRECTABLE MOVEMENT OF THE BLADES OF THE AIRPLANE'S LEFT PROPELLER BELOW THE FLIGHT IDLE POSITION. (NTSB REPORT AAR-92/03)
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
Wikipedia article: Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311
- Revision
- 1369051082 · 2026-08-12 · retrieved 2026-09-18
- Wikidata
- Q4816544
- Licence
- Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA91MA033
- Event ID
- 20001212X16773
- Case number
- DCA91MA033
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
- Record
- Wikipedia article "Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311" (page 11107891, revision 1369051082); merged with NTSB case DCA91MA033 (events / aircraft)
- Date
- NTSB record DCA91MA033: NTSB API eventDate, eventTimeUtc and eventTimeUtcOffsetHours (local date)
- Place and country
- Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA91MA033
- Map position
- NTSB record DCA91MA033: events decimal coordinates
- Aircraft, operator and route
- NTSB record DCA91MA033: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
- Operation
- NTSB record DCA91MA033: operated under Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
- Fatalities
- NTSB record DCA91MA033: NTSB API totalFatal
- Ground fatalities
- NTSB record DCA91MA033: NTSB API ongroundFatal
- Summary
- Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
- One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311" and NTSB case DCA91MA033, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.