ANC26FA002 · Raytheon Hawker 800XP

On October 16, 2025, about 1728 eastern standard time, a Raytheon Hawker 800XP airplane, Mexican registration XA-JMR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Bath Township, Michigan. The captain, co-pilot, and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 local area post-maintenance flight. The airplane, which was owned and operated by Aerolineas del Centro, arrived at Duncan Aviation’s maintenance facility at Battle Creek Executive Airport at Kellogg Field (BTL), Battle Creek, Michigan for routine maintenance in March 2025. According to Duncan Aviation maintenance personnel, multiple routine inspections were completed on the airplane over seven months. One inspection included the removal of the wing leading edges and TKS ice protection panels for a visual inspection for cracks and signs of corrosion. Per the manufacturer, after the leading edge inspection, a post-maintenance stall test flight is required before the airplane can be returned to service. According to preliminary automatic dependent system broadcast (ADS-B) data, the airplane departed BTL at 1708 and entered a left climbing turn and proceeded to an area about 9 miles northeast of BTL. The flight crew asked air traffic control (ATC) for a block altitude from FL140 to FL160, and ATC approved the request. The airplane leveled off at FL150. At 1727 the airplane began a rapid descent from FL140, during which time there was an indiscernible transmission from the accident airplane, ATC responded “XA-JMR Cleveland.” The flight crew responded, “we are in a...” followed by a transmission in Spanish which translated to “in a stall, recovering, sorry.” There were no further transmissions from the flight crew. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 9 miles northeast of Capital Region International Airport, Lansing, Michigan (KLAN), at an elevation of 850 ft mean sea level and oriented on a magnetic heading of 150°. The airplane impacted terrain in a relatively flat attitude. A postimpact fire consumed a large portion of the main wreckage with the exception of a portion of the right wing, both winglets, and the empennage section. All major structures were accounted for at the accident site.

Figure 1 View of accident site main wreckage. According to Duncan Aviation personnel, the flight crew was the primary crew for the accident airplane, and they reported that they flew the airplane about 150 hours per year. Duncan Aviation personnel also reported that just prior to the completion of the maintenance procedures, the captain was provided with a list of experienced test pilots, for hire, to perform the post-maintenance stall test flight. However, after being unable to coordinate the stall test flight with a test pilot, the flight crew elected to perform the post-maintenance stall test themselves. According to their personal flight logbooks, the captain and co-pilot exclusively flew the accident airplane, and they completed their most recent training at a commercial simulator training facility in May 2025, about 5 months before the accident. The Pilot’s Operating Manual (POM) contained instructions on operating limitations, system descriptions, flight planning, flight handling, and techniques for the stall test flight. The POM provided the required conditions for the stall test which included altitude above 10,000 ft above ground level, 10,000 ft above clouds and below 18,000 ft mean sea level. In addition, this stall test could only be conducted during day visual meteorological conditions with a good visual horizon, with the autopilot disengaged, an operative stall identification system, the external surfaces free of ice, the ventral tank empty and weather radar on standby. The stall test section of the POM also noted stall characteristics and stated “There is no natural stall warning or aerodynamic buffet prior to the stall. It is acceptable for stick pusher operation to be coincident with the natural stall, provided that any rolling tendency can be restrained to within 20° bank angle by normal use of ailerons.” A “Caution” advisory stated: A FREQUENT REASON FOR UNACCEPTABLE STALL CHARACTERISTICS IS A TENDENCY TO ROLL THE STALL. IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR A MODERATE ROLL TO OCCUR, PROVIDED THAT NORMAL USE OF AILERONS CAN LIMIT THE ROLL ANGLE TO NO MORE THAN 20%. AILERON SNATCH MAY OCCUR AT OR PRIOR TO STALL AND IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE AILERON SNATCH MAY BE STRONG ENOUGH TO AFFECT RECOVERY USING AILERON INPUT, IN WHICH CASE THE ELEVATOR CONTROL MUST BE MOVED FORWARD TO DECREASE THE ANGLE OF ATTACK AND ALLOW THE RETURN OF NORMAL AILERON CONTROL. IN SUCH AN EVENT THE PILOT MUST BE PREPARED TO RECOVER FROM AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE. PILOTS CONDUCTING STALL CHECKS SHOULD HAVE PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN PERFORMING STALLS IN THE HAWKER AND MUST BE PREPARED FOR UNACCEPTABLE STALL BEHAVIOR AT ANY POINT LEADING UP TO AND THROUGHOUT THE MANEUVER. An investigator-in-charge from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) along with an NTSB aerospace engineer and an NTSB maintenance/airworthiness investigator, responded to the accident site and examined the airplane wreckage on October 18-22. Representatives from the airplane and engine manufactures, as well as aviation safety inspectors from the Federal Aviation Administration also responded to assist during the wreckage examination. During the detailed on-scene examination, the investigative team retained various components for additional examination and testing, and results are pending. The wreckage has been retained for further examination. The airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was recovered from the accident site, and it was sent to the NTSB’s vehicle recorder laboratory in Washington DC, and results are pending. The NTSB has investigated at least three other accidents/incidents involving the performance of required stall tests after maintenance in business jets.

Verbatim NTSB factual narrative from the NTSB dataset