CEN24FA243 · Waco YKC

The pilot and passenger were on a multi-leg cross-country flight returning to their home airport in Colorado from Mount Vernon, Ohio. The airplane, which was not certified for instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, departed on the cross-country flight about 0640 eastern daylight time and made several planned stops enroute. While at one of the planned stops, the passenger made the first of several text messages to the Oberlin, Kansas, airport manager about 0840 central daylight time (CDT) stating that the airport was their planned destination for the day. Additional messages were sent throughout the day pushing back their arrival time, with one message sent about 1601 CDT stating that the weather was looking too low at the airport and they were landing in Phillipsburg, Kansas. The airplane diverted to Phillipsburg and landed about 1615. While on the ground, the pilot made several telephone calls to both the airport manager in Oberlin, Kansas, and a family friend in Colby, Kansas, to inquire about the weather enroute and possible alternate destinations. The Oberlin airport manager informed the pilot that the weather included low ceilings and visibility, and he did not know when the weather would improve. The family friend in Colby reported that he assumed the pilot and passenger would overnight in Colby based on the telephone conversion he had with the pilot. The airplane departed about 1710 for their diverted destination of Colby, Kansas. Six minutes after departure, the passenger sent a final text message to the Oberlin airport manager stating that they were “going to try and go south to get out of this stuff.” Air traffic control (ATC) radar data beginning about 1746 showed the airplane made several climbing turns before the data ended about 1748, when the airplane started a right descending bank. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain in a 90° right bank and about a 40° nose-down attitude. Distribution of the wreckage and damage signatures observed during the postaccident examination were indicative of loss of control due to inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions. Postaccident examination revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was equipped with the required visual flight rules (VFR) flight instruments, as well as a turn indicator and a vertical speed indicator. The closest weather station to the accident site was Oberlin, Kansas, which had an automatic weather observation system. Its precipitation discriminator was out of service, resulting in the system being unable to report precipitation type at the time of the accident. However, it did report low instrument flight rules (LIFR) conditions due to overcast clouds at 300 ft above ground level (agl). The temperature and dew point were both 17° C, indicating 100% relative humidity, suggesting that the visibility was likely also obscured due to fog at the time of the accident. Other surrounding stations reported marginal ceilings. None of the available weather forecasts and observation products on ForeFlight at the time of departure indicated IFR conditions enroute. Surface observations showed VFR to marginal VFR (MVFR) at the departure and destination airports, with MVFR ceilings forecast enroute by the National Weather Service (NWS) Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) Aviation Cloud Forecast. The only weather product that depicted IFR to LIFR conditions was the GFA Cloud & Visibility, which was not available on ForeFlight. The forecast for 1700 showed ceilings of 1,000 ft agl to less than 500 ft agl around the accident site. However, this would have been unknown to the pilot as it is not published on ForeFlight. The NWS high resolution rapid refresh (HRRR) numerical model sounding over the accident site depicted MVFR clouds and a high probability of reduced visibility at the time of the accident. The sounding estimated the cloud tops for the low clouds observed by satellite as about 6,500 ft mean sea level (msl). Additionally, private weather stations recorded a drop in solar radiation along the route of flight that suggests an area of unexpected fog around the accident site. A drilling rig crew about half a mile from the accident site reported being unable to see the top of their derrick at the time of the accident. Based on the evidence and the reported conservative nature of the pilot, he likely departed without knowledge of the weather conditions over the accident site. While enroute, the weather likely deteriorated suddenly as the airplane entered the unexpected area of dense fog. Radar data then shows the pilot attempted to climb and perform a 180° turn to exit the area of presumed dense fog. The highest altitude reached during the 180° turn according to radar data was 4,625 ft msl at 1748:25, with the estimated cloud tops at 6,500 ft msl, before the airplane entered a descending right spiral. Loss of external visual references during VFR flight presents a high risk of spatial disorientation and loss of control. Several risk factors for spatial disorientation were or may have been present in this accident: the airplane, which was not equipped for IFR flight; the pilot’s unknown IFR currency; and the weather conditions, which included dense fog. Based on these factors, as well as the orientation and fragmentation of the wreckage consistent with a high-energy impact, the pilot likely experienced spatial disorientation after entering instrument meteorological conditions and subsequently lost control of the airplane.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset