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WPR24FA182 · Vans Aircraft Inc RV-12

6 Jun 2024 · Auburn, WA, United States

Vans Aircraft Inc RV-12 · Accident: flight control system malfunction/failure on approach

From Auburn Municipal Airport (S50) to Auburn Municipal Airport (S50)

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Event

NTSB case
WPR24FA182
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
1 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Vans Aircraft Inc RV-12

Aircraft type
Vans RV-12
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N412JN
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Auburn Municipal Airport (S50), Auburn, WATo Auburn Municipal Airport (S50), Auburn, WA
Aircraft age
About 3 years (built 2021)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach · VFR pattern downwind
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Flight control system malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision
  • Personnel issues › Task performance

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

While returning to the airport from a routine pleasure flight, the pilot of the experimental light-sport airplane reported a total flight control failure while maneuvering to land. Data from the onboard electronic flight instrument system and witness statements indicated that after turning from the crosswind to the downwind leg, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descending left turn consistent with a spin or spiral, culminating in a collision with a warehouse roof about 0.75 mile from the runway threshold.

Postaccident examination revealed that the left side (where the pilot was operating the airplane) control stick pushrod had become disconnected from the flaperon mixer bellcrank due to improper installation during construction. Both left and right pushrod rod-end eyebolt bearings had been installed in reverse orientation. The improper installation allowed the pushrod to gradually unscrew from its eyebolt, ultimately resulting in complete separation of the left pushrod. This condition rendered the primary roll control system on the pilot’s side ineffective.

The aircraft was equipped with an autopilot system featuring a “Level” mode capable of providing roll control independent of the cockpit control sticks. Prompt activation of this feature—or use of the rudder to counteract the developing roll—would likely have allowed the pilot to retain some degree of control. Similarly, the pilot would have been able to fully control the airplane if he had reached to his right and used the other control stick. However, given the sudden onset and rapid progression of the event, it is unlikely the pilot had sufficient time or situational awareness to identify and employ these options before the airplane entered an unusual attitude and became uncontrollable.

The pilot's autopsy identified heart disease, including severe coronary artery disease of a single coronary artery and mild thickening of the left cardiac ventricle. Although the pilot’s heart disease was associated with an increased risk of sudden impairment or incapacitation from a cardiac event, the circumstances of the accident were not consistent with a sudden medical event and it is unlikely that the pilot’s heart disease contributed to the accident.

The improper assembly error was traced to the original construction of the airplane and was visible in build photographs taken in 2019. The oversight persisted through final inspection and three years of subsequent operation. The airplane kit manufacturer later issued a service bulletin addressing correct installation of the pushrods.

Probable cause

The pilot’s improper installation of the control stick pushrod assemblies, which resulted in separation of the left pushrod and a total loss of roll control during flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure to detect the installation error during the airplane’s construction, inspection, and subsequent maintenance.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record WPR24FA182
Event ID
20240606194412
Case number
WPR24FA182
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 1ae8b65966e3b95b0fc1c057110b6f0ff95d8cbb0df686c6368cde0254b71507; retrieved 2026-09-15T08:16:14.475Z.