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ENG24LA012 · British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A

1 Mar 2024 · Missoula, MT, United States

Neptune Aviation Services British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A and Aero Air McDonnell Douglas DC-9-87 · Incident while standing

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Event

NTSB case
ENG24LA012
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Government
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Unknown

Aircraft 1 · British Aerospace BAE 146 SERIES 200A

Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N474NA
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From not recordedTo not recorded
Aircraft age
About 37 years (built 1987)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Public Aircraft
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Standing
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Miscellaneous/other
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Minor

Aircraft 2 · McDonnell Douglas DC-9-87

Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N296EA
Operator
Aero Air
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From not recordedTo not recorded
Aircraft age
About 33 years (built 1991)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Public Aircraft
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Not recorded
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Not recorded
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Minor

Cause areas

  • Organizational issues › Development

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service (USFS) had been using long term fire retardants (LTFRs) for many decades with no significant corrosion issues noted on their contract aircraft. Since at least 2006, the USFS had a single source supplier for LTFRs that provided retardants with monoammonium phosphate (MAP), diammonium phosphate (DAP), and/or ammonium polyphosphate (APP) used as the retardant salt. Beginning in 2020, the USFS allowed LTFRs to be submitted for qualification that contained retardant salts different from the historic phosphate-based retardants. The USFS granted conditional qualification to Fortress FR-100, a magnesium chloride-based (MgCl) dry powder concentrate, and Fortress FR-200, a MgCl-based liquid powder concentrate in May 2021 and August 2021, respectively, after they successfully completed uniform corrosion testing in accordance with USFS Specification 5100-304d, Long-Term Retardant, Wildland Firefighting at the USFS National Technology and Development Program (NTDP). The specified corrosion testing, which only examined the corrosive effects of a single retardant on one aluminum alloy, one steel alloy, one brass alloy, and one magnesium alloy, had been unchanged for many years. Beginning in June 2021, the first operational field evaluation (OFE) of FR-100 (MgCl-based) retardant began to show there was an incompatibility between MgCl-based and phosphate-based retardants when they were comingled in service. Increased corrosion was present on some aircraft components, and subsequent laboratory testing by NTDP confirmed the incompatibility between certain retardants. Test reports, USFS documents, and information received from operators and vendors suggested that the use of any new retardant should be delayed until further corrosion testing, more appropriate comingling studies, and updated operational procedures were completed. Additional testing by NTDP completed in July 2023 showed that alternating between phosphate-based and MgCl based retardants caused significant residue buildup in the level sensors used in the retardant tanks. Despite the evidence of incompatibilities between the retardants and without performing additional corrosion testing, the USFS decided to initiate an integration operational field evaluation (I-OFE) during the 2023 fire season with two large air tankers using Fortress FR-200 (MgCl-based) and Perimeter Solutions MVP-Fx (MAP and DAP-based) retardants. During the first part of the season both airtankers carried only FR-200 retardant then both airtankers alternated between FR-200 and MVP-Fx retardants for the second part of the season. At the conclusion of the 2023 fire season, post-season maintenance on the two airplanes involved found significant evidence of corrosion on the internal tank structure and components as well as the external airplane structure. Several items from each airplane were examined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lab under the direction of the investigation. For some of the items, NIST concluded that there was galvanic corrosion occurring where the steel and aluminum alloy components were coupled electrically in the presence of liquid retardants. For other items, NIST concluded that the corrosion was the result of a breakdown in material surface protection treatments in the presence of the liquid or dried retardants. NIST also examined the chemical interaction of the retardants and concluded that there is a likely interaction related to the nitrogen-based proprietary corrosion inhibitors present in the different retardants. Preliminary studies by NTDP based on the investigation findings validated the galvanic corrosion action between certain steel and aluminum alloys in the presence of a single liquid retardant, either FR-200 or MVP-Fx. NTDP also performed additional studies at the request of the investigation examining the galvanic corrosion action in comingled retardants that showed the comingled products resulted in more severe corrosion on certain alloys. The more severe galvanic corrosion in comingled retardants is likely due to the more acidic mixture that results from comingling. NTDP has initiated several corrosion studies to further examine corrosive mechanisms on additional alloys and built-up structures in the presence of LTFRs.

Probable cause

The use of a new long term fire retardant with a chemical composition incompatible with the retardant previously in use for the integration-operational field evaluation without adequate testing and qualification.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ENG24LA012
Event ID
20240311193912
Case number
ENG24LA012
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 6a42584c55402ad49d974ad2727df4ba40f71254d588df97ef9467c87ff78404; retrieved 2026-09-13T18:43:58.341Z.