FLIGHT FINDINGSAVIATION OCCURRENCE MAP
Back to map

WPR23LA352 · Wayne Toddun SLING 4 TSI

25 Sept 2023 · San Pedro, CA, United States

Sling Flying Club Wayne Toddun SLING 4 TSI · Accident: powerplant system/component malfunction/failure en route

From Zamperini Field (TOA) to an unrecorded destination

Report a problem

Event

NTSB case
WPR23LA352
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
Event fatalities
Unknown
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Wayne Toddun SLING 4 TSI

Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N135WT
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Zamperini Field (TOA), Torrance, CATo not recorded
Aircraft age
About 5 years (built 2018)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · cruise
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Powerplant system/component malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot and passenger departed on a local flight and were returning to land when the accident occurred. While on final approach to land, the pilot reported to air traffic control that the engine lost power. The pilot was cleared to land. A witness video recorded the airplane as it flew north trailing white smoke. About 12 seconds later the smoke ceased and the airplane began a right descending turn. The airplane then entered a steep right turn in a nose-down attitude and rapidly descended until it disappeared from view. The airplane impacted a field about 3 nm from the destination airport. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed internal catastrophic damage and extensive damage to the No. 4 cylinder. Both spark plugs were mechanically damaged and both the intake and exhaust valves had separated at the stems. The cylinder wall and piston face were mechanically damaged, and the piston head was also breached. Data from the engine control unit recorded 350 knock (detonation) events at cylinder No. 4 in the previous 3 hours and 41 minutes of engine operation. A warning in the maintenance manual states that oil residues are permissible on up to 20% of the running surface, else the valve may be at risk of failure at the weld point due to overheating. A metallurgical examination revealed discoloration from oil residue along the running surface of cylinder 4 that was three times greater than the maximum permissible tolerance prescribed by the manufacturer. The discoloration indicated the valve stem was subjected to high heat signatures and likely overheated. The damage to the cylinder indicates that the exhaust valve failed first and damaged the cylinder. Engine data suggests the No. 2 cylinder also failed when metal fragments entered it, damaging the piston and cylinder head. Cylinder No. 2 sustained less damage than cylinder No. 4, which suggests that the No. 4 cylinder failed first. Video of the accident flight also showed white smoke trailing the airplane about one minute before the accident. The presence of the white smoke was likely due to the No 4 cylinder exhaust valve overheating. Impact damage to the No 4. cylinder exhaust valve precluded determining if the valve failed in fatigue or overstress. The No. 4 cylinder exhaust valve contained oil residue on the running surface of the stem that exceeded the tolerance by 300%. In addition, the distance between the valve stem and valve guide for cylinder Nos. 3 and 4 exceeded the 100% tolerance from the manufacturer. The lack of heat dispersion likely caused the No. 4 cylinder exhaust valve to overheat and ultimately fail, which resulted in engine failure. Although the operator failed to comply with the engine manufacturer’s oil inspection and maintenance schedule required by their fuel blend of automotive fuel and 100LL aviation grade gasoline, there was insufficient evidence to determine that their fuel blend practice was responsible for accelerating the valve wear.

Probable cause

A total loss of engine power due to a failure of the No. 4 cylinder exhaust valve from overheating and excessive wear.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record WPR23LA352
Event ID
20230926193140
Case number
WPR23LA352
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 2a5b352c99b8cdef28ba6bddbf065fc606c09e8d1119ce525d90d5b6fcfa83eb; retrieved 2026-09-16T18:09:48.060Z.