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ERA23LA369 · Eurocopter Deutschland Gmbh EC135T2

13 Sept 2023 · Fargo, GA, United States

Eurocopter Deutschland Gmbh EC135T2 · Accident: system/component malfunction/failure (non-power) while maneuvering

From Middle Georgia Regional Airport (MCN) to Gainesville Regional Airport (GNV)

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Event

NTSB case
ERA23LA369
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Eurocopter Deutschland Gmbh EC135T2

Aircraft type
Eurocopter EC135
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N273AM
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Middle Georgia Regional Airport (MCN), Macon, GATo Gainesville Regional Airport (GNV), Gainesville, FL
Aircraft age
About 20 years (built 2003)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Maneuvering
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
System/component malfunction/failure (non-power)
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot of the helicopter reported that she had been in cruise flight for about 1 hour about 1,500 ft mean sea level. All systems were normal when she heard a “bang” and felt a “very strong” vibration in the tail rotor pedals. The pilot immediately identified a site for a precautionary landing, which she completed without further incident. Initial examination of the Fenestron, a 10-bladed tail rotor that acts as a ducted fan for anti-torque control, revealed that one blade was separated at its root. The blades were numbered 1-10, with the fractured blade identified as No. 10. The separated portion of the No. 10 blade was not recovered. The examination of the fracture surface of the No. 10 blade revealed features consistent with fatigue. The general construction of each blade comprised a die-forged aluminum alloy blade and integrated root protected with a sealed chromic acid anodization layer. A chromium oxide layer was deposited on the inner and outer bearing surfaces of the blade root followed by a low-friction varnish. The fracture origin area consisted of localized intergranular features (stress concentrations) from which fatigue cracking progressed through approximately 77% of the blade cross-section before ultimately separating in tensile, or bending, overstress. The initiating event could not be identified. The most likely initiation of intergranular cracking was a compromised anodic oxide film that allowed exposure to a corrosive environment (i.e. marine and/or industrial), as evidenced by the presence of chlorine and sulfur on the blade surfaces. The corrosive exposure resulted in the formation of a network of intergranular cracks at the blade surface. The anodic oxide film was most likely compromised due to abrasive wear (erosion) during operation and/or removal during abrasive maintenance processes. The appearance of the fracture origin area on the pressure side surface prior to blade separation was likely a corrosion pit on the order of 100–120 microns (0.004 – 0.005 inch) with similar depth estimated from oxidation patterns on the fracture surface at the origin area. Due to the intergranular nature of cracking at the fracture origin area, the appearance would not resemble a dent or a score, and it would likely be difficult to detect visually or with the aid of other typical non-destructive inspection techniques.

Probable cause

The separation of the outer span of a tail rotor blade during flight as a result of localized intergranular corrosion due to a diminished protective coating at a critical location on the tail rotor blade surface that, combined with cyclic loading, resulted in fatigue crack propagation initiated at a corrosion site.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ERA23LA369
Event ID
20230913193059
Case number
ERA23LA369
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: f52e00b3141f854a1c9ebe76d8982fe6e81c3ec0a1be8c3d59e898addb728519; retrieved 2026-09-16T18:07:11.196Z.