Hawaiian Airlines Flight 3
Airbus A330-243 · Incident: flight control system malfunction/failure en route
From Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL)
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA22LA212
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Incident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- Unknown
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Airbus A330-243
- Aircraft type
- Airbus A330
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N393HA
- Operator
- Hawaiian Airlines
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, CATo Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, HI
- Aircraft age
- About 9 years (built 2013)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · climb to cruise
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Flight control system malfunction/failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- None
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The flight crew reported that, when the airplane climbed through flight level 360, the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) trim wheel began to move “very quickly” forward and aft, creating small pitching oscillations. No message appeared on the airplane’s electronic centralized aircraft monitor, and no flight deck alerts annunciated. The crew decided to turn off the autopilot to isolate the malfunction. However, when the autopilot was off, the trim wheel continued to move erratically. The crew then reengaged the autopilot, and small pitch oscillations resumed. These oscillations, which were below the threshold to trigger a fault, were partially countered by flight control system inputs, but the trim wheel continued its uncommanded movement. The first officer (the pilot flying) then turned off the autopilot and manually flew the airplane for the rest of the flight while the captain (the pilot monitoring) managed the situation. The flight crew contacted air traffic control to declare an emergency and advise that fuel would need to be jettisoned before the airplane returned to the airport. Afterward, fuel was jettisoned until the airplane reached its maximum landing weight. The airplane landed uneventfully, and the emergency was terminated after landing. The airplane’s Post Flight Report information showed the “PITCH TRIM ACTR [actuator] OVERRIDE SWITCH” fault message. The maintenance crew at the airport replaced the pitch trim actuator (a subcomponent of the THS actuator), and an operational test of the THS actuator was successful. One possible scenario for the uncommanded pitch trim wheel movement involved a failure or malfunction of a subcomponent of the THS actuator (the No. 1 digital electronic module, which digitizes the analog signals from THS position sensors. Extensive testing of the THS actuator and its subcomponents, including the incident pitch trim actuator and the No. 1 digital electronic module, was conducted at the manufacturers’ facilities. However, the testing did not identify the specific reason for the uncommanded pitch trim wheel movements during the incident flight. As a result, the investigation was unable to determine the cause of the anomaly based on the available evidence. It is important to note that this investigation found that the anomaly appeared to be isolated to components that were either removed and repaired or replaced on the incident airplane. Further, the incident airplane had no pitch or pitch trim flight control faults related to the circumstances of this incident since the THS actuator was removed and replaced in November 2022.
Probable cause
Uncommanded movement of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer control wheel for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record DCA22LA212
- Event ID
- 20220927106004
- Case number
- DCA22LA212
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, cause areas, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 3d333a2c0447496671e0a5b85fd085c30dd7dfee115c2a8fb4e55d921ef62105; retrieved 2026-09-16T16:06:38.156Z.