CEN21FA272 · Antenor Velazco LANCAIR EVOLUTION
Antenor Velazco LANCAIR EVOLUTION · Accident: flight control system malfunction/failure on approach
From Neosho Hugh Robinson Airport (EOS) to an unrecorded destination
Event
- NTSB case
- CEN21FA272
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 2 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Antenor Velazco LANCAIR EVOLUTION
- Aircraft type
- Antenor Velazco LANCAIR EVOLUTION
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N704AK
- Operator
- Unknown
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Neosho Hugh Robinson Airport (EOS), Neosho, MOTo not recorded
- Aircraft age
- About 4 years (built 2017)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Approach
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Flight control system malfunction/failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Destroyed
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems
- Personnel issues › Psychological
- Personnel issues › Task performance
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The pilot and copilot were established on an instrument approach to the destination airport in visual meteorological conditions. About 3 miles from the end of the runway, the airplane began a left descending turn, during which the controller queried if the pilot was performing a 360° turn. The copilot replied that the airplane’s autopilot had failed. The airplane continued the left turning descent until ground impact. Several witnesses near the accident site saw the airplane flying low before the left wing impacted powerlines. The airplane came to rest on a hillside and was mostly consumed by postcrash fire.
Examination of the airplane revealed that the left flap control rod end and associated attachment bolt were missing from the assembly. The threads for fastening the missing flap control rod attachment bolt were intact in the attachment bracket. The area around the threaded hole was rubbed, consistent with off-axis contact with the outboard end of the flap control rod attachment bolt. Corresponding off-axis contact deformation was observed at the edge of the control rod attachment bolt through-hole on the inboard side of the bracket. A piece of the right flap control rod remained attached to the bracket with an intact control rod attachment bolt. Like the left attachment bracket, the aft attachment bolts for the right flap control attachment bracket were secured with safety wire. While the head for the right flap control rod attachment bolt was drilled for use with safety wire, no safety wire was observed attached to the control rod attachment bolt.
A review of maintenance records showed that paint work was performed on the airframe about 2 years before the accident, during which the flight control surfaces were removed. A follow-up entry noted that, “flight controls were balanced and installed with new hardware.” The airplane’s most recent condition inspection was completed about 8 months before the accident.
Based on the available evidence, it is likely that when the flight controls were reinstalled after the paint work, the left flap and right flap control rod attachment bolts were not installed with safety wire. The use of safety wire on these bolts is mandated per the airplane build manual. These anomalies were not detected by the mechanic following the reinstallation or during the subsequent condition inspection nor were they detected during multiple preflight inspections by the pilot.
The undamaged threads in the attachment for the left flap control rod indicated that the bolt likely backed out due to vibrations and the lack of the required safety wire. With that attachment lost, only the right flap would have deployed when the pilot was preparing to land, causing a flap asymmetry and the resulting turn to the left. It is likely the pilot was distracted by the misdiagnosis of the handling issue as an autopilot anomaly. During the subsequent turn away from the approach path, the pilot failed to maintain altitude, which resulted in impact with powerlines and terrain.
Probable cause
The pilot’s diversion of attention following an asymmetric flap deployment, which resulted in a descent and collision with powerlines. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s failure to properly secure the flap control rod attachment bolts, their failure to identify that the bolts were improperly secured during the subsequent condition inspection, and the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspections.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record CEN21FA272
- Event ID
- 20210616103276
- Case number
- CEN21FA272
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: a6c26957f208b500f6081adb2678c33983445e8ecce45cef11f41023e3059531; retrieved 2026-09-15T07:29:54.196Z.