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CEN19LA049 · Beech 58 P

25 Dec 2018 · Sioux Falls, SD, United States

Beech 58 P · Accident: aerodynamic stall/spin on approach

From Gerald R. Ford International Airport (GRR) to Marv Skie / Lincoln County Airport (Y14)

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Event

NTSB case
CEN19LA049
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
2 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Instrument Meteorological Cond

Beech 58 P

Aircraft type
Beechcraft 58
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N6745V
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Gerald R. Ford International Airport (GRR), Grand Rapids, MITo Marv Skie / Lincoln County Airport (Y14), Tea, SD
Aircraft age
About 38 years (built 1980)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach · IFR final approach
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Aerodynamic stall/spin
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot and passenger were on a cross-country flight and an instrument flight rules approach in instrument meteorological conditions. According to air traffic control transcripts, an air traffic controller at the destination airport cleared the flight for the RNAV approach for runway 33. According to ADS-B flight track data, the airplane then turned toward the final approach path just inside the initial approach fix at 3,100 ft mean sea level (msl) and 156 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS). Subsequently, the airplane proceeded west of the final approach centerline, turned back through the centerline to the east, and then back to the west, resembling s-turns through the extended centerline. During the s-turns across the extended centerline, the controller cleared the airplane to land. Two minutes later, the airplane was about 3,000 ft msl and 78 KCAS, and then began to rapidly descend.

According to a witness and video footage of the accident, the airplane descended in a steep, nosedown attitude. The witness added that it appeared that he then “saw airplane try to pull out of a dive” just before it impacted the ground.

The airplane impacted trees and a building and then came to rest in a residential neighborhood about 200 ft south of the last radar location. The airplane was massively fragmented and a postimpact fire ensued. Impact and fire damage precluded a thorough examination and functional testing of the related airplane systems. Examination of both engines and propeller assemblies revealed signatures consistent with symmetric power development at the time of the accident.

According to a family member of the pilot, 3 months before the accident, the pilot was en route at altitude when the airplane suddenly nosed over. According to a work order, 3 weeks before the accident, the autopilot was removed and repaired. The repair station owner reported that, after a flight 3 days before the accident, the pilot told him that he had no issues with the airplane and that the flight was uneventful.

A review of the airplane’s flight track showed the pilot making S-turns across the approach course, which is consistent with the pilot hand-flying the approach, not a coupled autopilot approach. Therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot was flying the instrument approach using the autopilot system. Further, although the autopilot system could not be functionally tested due to impact and fire damage, it is unlikely that the autopilot system played a role in the accident if it was not in use.

Therefore, based on the radar data, it is likely that the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed during the final approach, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall. Given the witness account and surveillance video, it is likely the pilot was attempting to recover from the stall but did not have adequate altitude to do so.

Probable cause

The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during the instrument approach which led to an aerodynamic stall.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record CEN19LA049
Event ID
20181226X84625
Case number
CEN19LA049
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 7dfa54240f460a76f8012ae2bded14e9004a73783bdb540d23bcb393646e2627; retrieved 2026-09-15T06:52:31.911Z.