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WPR19FA022 · Piper PA28 236

9 Nov 2018 · Guthrie Center, IA, United States

Piper PA28 236 · Accident: powerplant system/component malfunction/failure en route

From Le Mars Municipal Airport (LRJ) to Osceola Municipal Airport (I75)

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Event

NTSB case
WPR19FA022
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
4 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Piper PA28 236

Aircraft type
Piper PA28
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N91770
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Le Mars Municipal Airport (LRJ), Le Mars, IATo Osceola Municipal Airport (I75), Osceola, IA
Aircraft age
About 39 years (built 1979)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · cruise
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Powerplant system/component malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems
  • Personnel issues › Physical

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

About 45 minutes into the cross-country flight, the student pilot passenger reported to air traffic control that the pilot was having a heart attack and that he was going to take control of the airplane and divert to an airport about 20 miles away; however, another airport was much closer, and controllers received no further communications from the pilot. The student then reported over the nearby airport’s common traffic advisory frequency that he would attempt to divert there. GPS flight track data indicated that, a short time later, the airplane began to fly in an erratic manner, climbing and descending over the area of the diversion airport. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain in a wings-level attitude.

All four occupants sustained fatal injuries, and toxicology testing indicated that all had high levels of carboxyhemoglobin, which is caused by the inhalation of carbon monoxide (CO), an odorless, tasteless, colorless, nonirritating gas formed by hydrocarbon combustion. Levels in both pilots and one passenger where high enough to have caused confusion, seizures, or loss of consciousness. There was no evidence the pilot had a heart attack, so his symptoms were likely due to the CO poisoning.

The engine was equipped with three identical exhaust mufflers. Examination of the aft muffler revealed a crack that allowed engine exhaust gases to enter the cabin through the cabin heating system.

The muffler’s crack developed as a result of corrosion and thinning of the muffler wall. The crack and small perforations in the muffler wall were likely present at the time of the last inspection, which occurred shortly before the accident; however, due to damage from impact, it could not be determined if the extent of cracking was readily visible at the time of inspection. Also, the crack could have opened just before the accident flight due to an engine backfire that occurred during startup.

Use of a pressure check during an inspection could help identify cracks and small perforations that can be obscured by oxides and deposits during a visual inspection; however, the manufacturer's service manual only recommended a pressure check when a visual inspection could not be accomplished.

The manufacturer and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) both recommended that the mufflers be replaced at or near 1,000 hours time in service (TIS). Although maintenance records revealed that three mufflers were replaced over the previous 27 years, the records did not indicate if the cracked muffler was one of those that had been replaced. Review of the available records indicated that the cracked muffler likely had at least 752 hours TIS, but due to missing records, it could have had over 1,033 hours TIS. Additionally, one of the mufflers was replaced at 549 hours TIS, well before the manufacturer's recommended interval, and likely an indication of premature failure.

The hazard of CO poisoning via leaks in reciprocating engine exhaust systems that are used to provide cabin heat has long been known to the industry. In 2004, the NTSB issued a safety recommendation to the FAA to require the installation of CO detectors in all single-engine airplanes such as the accident type.

In response, the FAA undertook extensive research on the detection and prevention of CO exposure in general aviation aircraft, created a technical standard order specifying minimum performance standards for CO detectors, and recommended, but did not require, that all operators install CO detectors.

The FAA concluded that the primary method to prevent CO contamination in the cabin is through proper inspection and maintenance of mufflers and exhaust system components and that CO detectors are a secondary method of preventing CO exposure. The FAA further stated that since a lack of a CO detector alone is not unsafe, installing a CO detector would not correct an unsafe condition.

Because the FAA did not require installation of CO detectors, the safety recommendation was classified "Closed – Unacceptable Action."

Probable cause

Pilot incapacitation due to carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of an undetected crack in an engine exhaust muffler, which permitted entry of exhaust gasses into the cabin via the cabin heat system.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record WPR19FA022
Event ID
20181110X83525
Case number
WPR19FA022
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: c0f6fee7971496679798e616b9381ba58b0fe6f93002918bebfecadb333cbe20; retrieved 2026-09-15T06:50:47.889Z.