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CEN18FA258 · Bell 47G 2

6 Jul 2018 · Arlington, IN, United States

Central Indiana AG Services Bell 47G 2 · Accident: part(s) separation from aircraft while maneuvering

From Arlington, IN to Arlington, IN

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Event

NTSB case
CEN18FA258
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
1 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Bell 47G 2

Aircraft type
Bell 47
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N96195
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Arlington, INTo Arlington, IN
Aircraft age
About 65 years (built 1953)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 137: Agricultural
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Maneuvering · low-altitude flying
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Part(s) separation from aircraft
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor
  • Aircraft › Fluids/miscellaneous hardware

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The commercial helicopter pilot was conducting aerial applications work on a corn field. The helicopter did not return to the loading platform when expected, and a subsequent search for the helicopter ensued. The wreckage of the helicopter was located near the south edge of a field being sprayed. The upper transmission, mast, and main rotor separated from the helicopter and were located about 75 ft north of the main wreckage. Ground scars, damage to the crop, and damage to the helicopter was consistent with an inflight separation of the upper transmission, mast, and main rotor. A postimpact fire ensued and damaged the cabin and engine of the helicopter.

Postaccident examination of the lower transmission housing found elongation of four of the bolt holes and tearing of two of the bolt holes; two of the bolt holes were unremarkable.

The upper main rotor transmission housing pieces and gears separated from the lower transmission housing due to shear fractures of the threads in six of the eight bolts attaching the housing pieces. The fractures likely occurred due to the fracture of threads on the two bolts that were weakened by thread damage from a prior installation using those bolts as discussed below.

Specifically, these bolts showed damage on intact threads adjacent to the sheared threads. The damage had circumferential markings and a profile matching the nut threads with deformation to the remaining thread, consistent with an over-torque installation of a nut on the bolt. However, because the nuts likely did not back off from their installed position, the thread damage would have occurred during a prior installation. Thus, these two bolts were likely installed on the accident helicopter with damaged threads that were not detected at the time of installation.

Additionally, one of the bolts had thread profile anomalies indicating that the bolt was likely manufactured with an incompletely formed thread. The deviations from the standard thread profile could have contributed to an improper fit with the installed nut and might have contributed to the thread damage on that bolt during a prior installation.

For the other six bolts, the fit between the nut and the bolt might have contributed to threads shearing. The major diameter of threads on one of these six bolts was below minimum specification, which would limit the thread engagement to produce a shear fracture of the thread, and the major diameter of another of these bolts was close to the lower limit. No evidence of prior thread damage was observed on either of these bolts, indicating the failures were likely secondary to the failure of bolts Nos. 2 and 3.

The housing assembly attachments showed evidence of poor maintenance practice. Deviations from the assembly drawing included the use of bolts with an incorrect number of washers and incorrect length. Furthermore, the damage to bolts 2 and 3 from a prior installation was not detected when the bolts were installed on the accident helicopter.

Limited maintenance records were available for the helicopter. According to the available records, the main rotor transmission was replaced in 2009, and the transmission bolts were retorqued in 2014, about 73.6 flight hours before the accident. The investigation was unable to determine if any other maintenance was conducted on the transmission fasteners, when the maintenance was performed that initially damaged the threads of the two of the bolts, or when the damaged bolts were installed on the helicopter.

No other mechanical anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal operation. The inflight separation of the upper transmission was due to the weakened bolt threads as a result of damage during a prior installation which caused the threads on those bolts as well as the threads on other bolts to fracture. However, the prior installation damage could not be associated to any particular maintenance action.

Probable cause

The inflight separation of the upper transmission due to the thread failure of transmission housing attachment bolts, which were installed on the helicopter with thread damage from a prior installation.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record CEN18FA258
Event ID
20180706X04105
Case number
CEN18FA258
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: b8ba8aac5de01a1c08fda09335b60ddcf28220f3a791777caad24e882e72edc1; retrieved 2026-09-15T06:43:45.689Z.