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ANC18FA022 · Beech 35 A33

30 Jan 2018 · Helenwood, TN, United States

Beech 35 A33 · Accident: fuel starvation en route

From Barrow County Airport (WDR) to Grimes Field (I74)

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Event

NTSB case
ANC18FA022
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
1 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Beech 35 A33

Aircraft type
Beechcraft 35
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N9378Y
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Barrow County Airport (WDR), Winder, GATo Grimes Field (I74), Urbana, OH
Aircraft age
About 58 years (built 1960)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · cruise
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Fuel starvation
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Fluids/miscellaneous hardware
  • Personnel issues › Task performance

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The private pilot and passenger were conducting a cross-country personal flight. About 1 hour 35 minutes after departing from an intermediary fuel stop, while in level cruise flight about 6,800 ft GPS altitude, the engine lost all power. The pilot stated that the engine gauges did not indicate any sign of overheating or other mechanical problems. He followed the emergency checklist and attempted to restart the engine without success. He subsequently broadcast a "mayday" call three times on the 121.5-MHz frequency but received no response. He attempted to glide the airplane to the nearest airport, but when he realized the airplane could not reach the airport, he conducted an emergency landing to a logging road in mountainous terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to wings and fuselage.

Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left auxiliary fuel tank was intact but empty. The left main fuel tank was intact, and between about 5 to 7 gallons of fuel were recovered from the left main fuel tank. The fuel pickup was separated at the wing root due to impact damage. Both the right auxiliary and right main fuel tanks were breached. About 7 to 10 gallons of fuel were recovered from the right main wing fuel tank. No fuel was present in the right auxiliary fuel tank. The electric auxiliary fuel pump switch was found in the "ON" position, and the fuel selector valve was found in the "AUX TANK" position, which was not the correct position for the air start procedure outlined in the Pilot Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Flight Manual. No fuel was present in either the fuel inlet line or the fuel return line. The fuel line between the fuel metering unit and the fuel manifold valve was removed at the throttle body, and about a teaspoon of fuel was recovered. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine and an engine test-run revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

Given the lack of fuel in the fuel lines forward of the engine firewall; the fuel present in the main fuel cells; and no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe, engine, or its systems, it is likely that the pilot mismanaged the available fuel, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. In addition, given that the fuel selector was found in the "AUX TANK" position, it is likely that the pilot did not follow the approved air start procedure in the Pilot Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual.

Probable cause

The pilot's mismanagement of the available fuel, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to follow the air start checklist.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ANC18FA022
Event ID
20180131X31336
Case number
ANC18FA022
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: d7e66014425544f1bd6d935f794f1e451e0d68063bccc88881dd7a26fdb5bc0b; retrieved 2026-09-15T06:31:55.847Z.