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ANC18LA020 · Eurocopter France SA330J PUMA J

26 Jan 2018 · Pacific Ocean, Japan

Erickson Helicopters Eurocopter France SA330J PUMA J · Accident: flight control system malfunction/failure while standing

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Event

NTSB case
ANC18LA020
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Eurocopter France SA330J PUMA J

Aircraft type
Eurocopter SA330
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N339EV
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From not recordedTo not recorded
Aircraft age
About 44 years (built 1974)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 133: Rotorcraft Ext. Load
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Standing · engine(s) operating
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Flight control system malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

According to the pilot, after landing the helicopter on the deck of the ship, power was increased on the No. 2 engine, while the No. 1 engine was reduced to ground idle in preparation for a freshwater rinse of the engines to prevent corrosion. Once the engines were configured, the pilot saw the lead mechanic squeeze the trigger on the wand, and then there was a rumbling sound followed by a rough shudder through the airframe. He then looked back at the cockpit instruments and everything looked normal for the condition the controls were in at the time. About that time, there was another shudder through the airframe, and he heard a change in the tone of the engine and gear box noise. He saw that the rotor speed had started to rise, and the gas generator speed of the No. 2 engine had also started to increase. He shut down the engines. Examination of the helicopter revealed that the tail rotor drive shaft had sheared, disconnecting the tail rotor from the main gear box.

Examination of the main gear box right freewheel assembly revealed that the small roller bearings were dislocated, the bearing cage was fragmented, and both tabs of the shur-lok washer showed signs of deformation with visible impact damage. Damage to these tabs is consistent with a sudden engagement of the bearing, resulting in an instantaneous spike in torque, known as freewheel jerk.

During the transition of the No. 2 engine from the idle position to the flight position, the condition of the freewheel small roller bearings likely prevented the freewheel cage from maintaining the large freewheel rollers on the ramp due to the effect of the freewheel spring. This situation is unstable until an "imbalance" modifies it and suddenly causes the cage and the freewheel rollers to rise on the ramp, imparting a torque spike into the rotor drive system.

The freewheel jerk felt during the rinsing operation of the No. 2 engine, with the No. 1 engine at idle, is likely the consequence of the degradation/dislocation of the roller bearing of the right freewheel (No. 2). Evidence of the degradation of the freewheel unit bearing was present in the two previous oil analyses. Although samples were taken before the accident in the most recent inspection, one sample was misplaced and not sent for analysis until after the event. Although not required per the maintenance manual at the time taken, had both of these samples been analyzed at the time of the inspection, it is likely the operator would have been able to detect the increase in metal before the bearing wear became severe enough to cause the jerk. After the accident, the operator implemented an internal requirement for oil sample analysis in shorter intervals.

Probable cause

The worn rear bearing of the freewheel unit. Contributing to the accident was the delay in analyzing an oil sample, which would have detected the increase in metal contaminants from the worn bearing.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ANC18LA020
Event ID
20180126X10900
Case number
ANC18LA020
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 56785bc13862113c924fc80c104ff9c9d2a4c2c36bba41e0bc1f3275046fd155; retrieved 2026-09-16T06:22:37.142Z.