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JetBlue Airways Flight 1416

18 Sept 2014 · Long Beach, CA, United States

Airbus A320 232 · Incident: loss of engine power (partial) during initial climb

From Long Beach International Airport (LGB) to Austin Bergstrom International Airport (AUS)

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Event

NTSB case
ENG14IA028
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Airbus A320 232

Aircraft type
Airbus A320
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N656JB
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Long Beach International Airport (LGB), Long Beach, CATo Austin Bergstrom International Airport (AUS), Austin, TX
Aircraft age
About 7 years (built 2007)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Initial climb
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Loss of engine power (partial)
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Minor

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant
  • Organizational issues › Development
  • Personnel issues › Task performance

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

On September 18, 2014, at approximately 0930 Pacific standard time (PST), an Airbus A320-232, registration number N656JB, flight number 1416, powered by two International Aero Engines (IAE) V2527-A5 turbofan engines, experienced a No. 2 (right) engine failure and subsequent undercowl fire during initial climb after departing Long Beach Airport (LGB), Long Beach, California The flightcrew shutdown the No. 2 engine, discharged both fire bottles, and performed an air turnback to Long Beach. The airplane made a successful and uneventful single-engine landing at LBG The incident flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 domestic passenger flight from LGB to Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (AUS) Austin, Texas. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. Examination of the outside of the engine revealed a fractured fuel pressure line to the station 2.5 low pressure compressor bleed valve slave actuator and evidence of thermal distress such as consumed, partially-consumed or oxidized insulation blankets, loop clamps cushions, wiring harness sheathing, and sooting of various components and cases. No case breaches or penetrations were noted although the LPT case did exhibited a localized outward bulge. Disassembly of the engine revealed that a single fir tree blade retaining lug from the high pressure turbine stage 2 disk had fractured and 2 HPT stage 2 blades had released. Metallurgical examination of the fractured HPT stage 2 disk lug revealed evidence of fatigue from multiple origins that propagated from the pressure side (PS) of the middle (No. 2) fillet towards the suction side (SS) almost through the entire width of the lug before finally fracturing due to progressive tensile overload. Closer examination of the fractured lug revealed a concave 'divot'/groove in the PS No. 2 fillet, immediately adjacent to the fracture surface that ran the entire length of the fillet. It was concluded that the groove appeared to be a tool mark resulting from the machining (broach) operation during the original manufacturing of the disk. Inspections of other HPT stage 2 disks manufactured using the same broaching tool at the fractured disk found the same grooving. Based on this event, the disk broaching procedures were reviewed and best practices were implemented to address these manufacturing deficiencies.

Probable cause

The probable cause of the engine failure and subsequent undercowl engine fire was due to the fatigue fracture of a high pressure turbine stage 2 disk blade retaining lug that released two blades which impacted the low pressure turbine case causing a fuel line to fracture spraying fuel on the hot engine cases where it ignited. During a machining operation of the disk lug, a tool mark was introduced that set up the area for fatigue cracks to initiate.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ENG14IA028
Event ID
20140918X52311
Case number
ENG14IA028
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: f5e8cf69a2815118e21e83c216291a40381526273756b74ed12087bab6104580; retrieved 2026-09-16T01:46:13.029Z.