ERA14LA227 · Piper PA-28-181

According to the instrument flight rules flight plan filed by the pilot, the airplane departed on an estimated 3.1-hour-long flight and had sufficient fuel on board for an estimated 4.8-hour-long flight. A direct 20- to 25-knot headwind existed at the airplane's cruise altitude. Based on the tachometer reading, about 4.2 hours into the flight, the pilot announced over the destination airport's common traffic advisory frequency that the airplane was "out of fuel." The airplane subsequently impacted swampy, wooded terrain 3 miles from the airport. The cockpit and cabin areas were destroyed by impact. There was no evidence of fuel in the wreckage or fuel spillage at the accident site. A detailed examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact mechanical anomaly with the airframe, engine, or fuel system that would have precluded normal operation.

According to the engine manufacturer, at the minimum allowable fuel flow, the engine had a fuel consumption rate of slightly less than 6 gallons per hour (gph) at 45 percent of rated power to slightly less than 15 gph at 100 percent power. Operators of similarly powered airplanes reported that the engine usually consumes 8.8 to 8.9 gph in a cruise configuration, which did not account for fuel used during taxi, takeoff, and climb. A review of flying club logs and aircraft fueling records revealed that the airplane consumed about 10 gph of fuel during the 12 flights in the month before the accident. According to the airplane manufacturer's Pilot's Operating Handbook, the performance charts are unfactored, and the effect of conditions not considered on the charts, including wind aloft on cruise and range performance, must be evaluated by the pilot. The handbook recommends that pilots conduct in-flight fuel flow and quantity checks.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset