DCA13CA088 · General Atomics MQ-9
General Atomics MQ-9 · Accident: abnormal runway contact during landing
From Cape Canaveral SFS Skid Strip (XMR) to Cape Canaveral SFS Skid Strip (XMR)
Narrative check · The NTSB narrative appears to contradict this record's fatalities. Values are shown as recorded, not corrected; compare with the narrative.
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA13CA088
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- Unknown Narrative disagrees
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Government
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
General Atomics MQ-9
- Aircraft type
- General Atomics MQ-9
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- CBP113
- Operator
- Customs and Border Protection
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Cape Canaveral SFS Skid Strip (XMR), Cocoa Beach, FLTo Cape Canaveral SFS Skid Strip (XMR), Cocoa Beach, FL
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Public Aircraft
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Landing · flare/touchdown
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Abnormal runway contact
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability
- Personnel issues › Task performance
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
On May 10, 2013, at 12:24 pm eastern daylight time (EDT) a General Atomics MQ-9 Predator, serial number CBP-113, operated by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Air and Marine (OAM), under the callsign Omaha 13, experienced a bounced landing and runway excursion on runway 13 at the Patrick Air Force Base Skid Strip (KXMR), Cape Canaveral Florida. The aircraft was substantially damaged, there were no injuries. The aircraft was operated as a non-military Public Aircraft in Restricted Airspace.
According to the operator, the aircraft had departed from KXMR at 0736 EDT for a routine patrol in the warning areas east of the airport. The aircraft conducted the launch and patrol without incident. The aircraft departed the patrol area at approximately 1142 EDT for return to KXMR. During the initial approach under VFR conditions, the aircraft conducted a go-around after first touching down. During the first landing attempt, the Sensor Operator (SO) called for a go-around when he noticed that the aircraft was slowing below the recommended landing speed based on the weight of the aircraft (computed reference speed was 102 knots) and that the aircraft was floating. The main landing gear contacted the runway, rebounding the aircraft back into the air. The aircraft remained airborne for the go-around procedure. Flight instrumentation in the GCS recorded a G-Load of +3.8 with the hard landing annunciator illuminating momentarily. Flight was re-established in the traffic pattern for a second landing procedure. Winds were reported from the control tower at 140 degrees at 11 knots with no gusts reported. The approach was made to Runway 13. Upon the second landing attempt to Runway 13, the control tower once again reported winds from 140 degrees at 11 knots. No gusts were reported by the control tower. As the aircraft approached its landing area, a flare to land was conducted resulting in the aircraft maintaining an attitude of approximately 20 feet above the runway (based on laser altimeter information) as power was reduced. The indicated airspeed dropped to approximately 89 knots as the landing gear came into contact with the runway nose wheel first. As the aircraft bounced on the nose wheel, the SO called for a go-around. The PIC stated that the aircraft was already on the ground and did not initiate a go-around at that time. The nose wheel bounced a second time with the height of the rebound being greater than the first. Upon the third contact of the nose wheel with the runway, the nose wheel tire failed and the aircraft rebounded with a higher pitch angle resulting in a high angle of attack warning. During the fourth contact with the runway, the landing gear sheared. The aircraft then fell onto its EO/IR payload (located under the nose portion of the fuselage) and veered off of the runway to Its left. The aircraft came to rest on its nose approximately 30 feet to the left side of the runway. The left winglet was in contact with the sod and its right main landing gear was holding up the right side of the aircraft. The G-Load recorded in the GCS during the accident landing sequence was +5.0. During both approaches and landings the LRE PIC utilized the daytime airframe camera for the approach and landing with the SO utilizing the daytime EO/IR system. The aircraft gross weight and center of gravity were within the limits as stated in the Operators Manual with no indication of CG related issue being present. The Ground Control Station(GCS) was configured in a standard setting that was appropriate for the mission being flown. An analysis was completed and it was determined by CBP UAS engineers that the GCS was working properly and did not contribute the accident.
Probable cause
an improper flare leading to a nose-wheel first touchdown, which resulted in a pilot induced oscillation (PIO). The PIO caused the UAS to pitch up abruptly on the third nose gear contact with the runway, resulting in the separation of the nose wheel assembly from the landing gear strut.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record DCA13CA088
- Event ID
- 20130511X50706
- Case number
- DCA13CA088
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 9c42ead8b4e04ec1a77b81b3db0911cb081bec7f4c56208a61dc82cd3ba62588; retrieved 2026-09-15T21:31:10.393Z.