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ERA12LA493 · Sikorsky S-58JT

1 Aug 2012 · Middletown, DE, United States

Aircrane Sikorsky S-58JT · Accident while maneuvering

From Middletown, DE (no airport) to Middletown, DE (no airport)

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Event

NTSB case
ERA12LA493
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Sikorsky S-58JT

Aircraft type
Sikorsky S-58
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N126GW
Operator
Aircrane
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Middletown, DE (no airport)To Middletown, DE (no airport)
Aircraft age
About 53 years (built 1959)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 133: Rotorcraft Ext. Load
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Maneuvering · hover
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Miscellaneous/other
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot had flown two uneventful external load lifts to place 2,900-lb air conditioning units on a warehouse roof. The pilot reported that, during the third lift, he felt vibration in the pedals that became violent, and the helicopter then began to rotate about its vertical axis. The air conditioning unit touched down on the roof as the helicopter was spinning. The pilot could not stop the helicopter's rotation, so he released the cable attached to the air conditioning unit and then maneuvered the helicopter away from the warehouse. He then increased forward speed, turned right to line up with a street, and conducted a roll-on landing.

Examination of the helicopter revealed that the entire aft portion of one of the four tail rotor blades had separated just aft of the blade's spar where a bond line existed. Examination of the tail rotor blade revealed high-stress progressive crack growth features at the root end of the fracture, buckling deformation adjacent to the fracture, and bending deformation of the leading edge, all of which were consistent with the tail rotor blade fracturing due to dynamic instability in the tail rotor. The progressive crack growth features observed on the fracture surface were associated with relatively high stress and few cycles and likely occurred after the deformation associated with the buckling. In addition, all four tail rotor blades exhibited bending deformation, indicating that they all experienced loads that exceeded the allowable design loads, and the deformation pattern was consistent with an external input on the tail rotor assembly overloading all of the blades rather than a failure in the blade causing it to become unstable. The helicopter manufacturer confirmed that such damage can be caused by dynamic tail rotor instability and that such instability can be accompanied by tail rotor vibration, as was experienced during the accident flight.

Although dynamic tail rotor instability rarely occurs, it has been known to occur on the accident helicopter make and model. To improve tail rotor stability, the helicopter manufacturer had introduced two modifications to the tail rotor system, and both of these modifications had been installed on the accident helicopter. Even with the modifications, dynamic tail instability can occur, and high values of left pedal, improper tail rotor cable tension (too high or too low), bottoming of the tail rotor control system spring, higher rotor speed, or relative wind from the right forward quadrant could increase susceptibility. However, a review of the helicopter's maintenance records did not reveal that any of the mechanical factors that could contribute to tail rotor instability existed, and wind was calm at the time of the accident. Additionally, after the damaged components were replaced, the helicopter was returned to service. The helicopter's flight manual also contained guidance stressing that pilots should immediately decrease the tail rotor pitch after encountering pedal vibration. If the pilot had recognized that the pedal vibration was indicative of tail rotor instability and immediately taken the proper corrective actions in accordance with this guidance, the accident might have been prevented.

Probable cause

The pilot's failure to recognize that the helicopter was experiencing tail rotor dynamic instability and to take immediate corrective actions during an external load lift, which resulted in the failure of a tail rotor blade.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ERA12LA493
Event ID
20120802X94619
Case number
ERA12LA493
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: cbe85c311fa8ae356bec1ba5b84a077356b004bac4a2297145c91fa38d90473a; retrieved 2026-09-15T19:14:02.486Z.