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ERA10TA493 · Bell 412 EP

22 Sept 2010 · Brooklyn, NY, United States

New York City Police Aviation Unit Bell 412 EP · Accident: powerplant system/component malfunction/failure on approach

From NYPD Air Operations (Floyd Bennett Field) Heliport (NY22) to NYPD Air Operations (Floyd Bennett Field) Heliport (NY22)

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Event

NTSB case
ERA10TA493
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Government
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Bell 412 EP

Aircraft type
Bell 412
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N412PD
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From NYPD Air Operations (Floyd Bennett Field) Heliport (NY22), Brooklyn, NYTo NYPD Air Operations (Floyd Bennett Field) Heliport (NY22), Brooklyn, NY
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Public Aircraft
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach · VFR pattern final
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Powerplant system/component malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant
  • Organizational issues › Development

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The helicopter was on final approach to its home heliport following an uneventful local patrol flight. About 300 feet above the ground, the flight crew heard a loud sound from the engine compartment, which was immediately followed by a loss of main rotor rpm. The crew subsequently performed an autorotation to the water below, and upon contact with the water, the installed flotation devices deployed. Examination of the helicopter's reduction gearbox revealed an approximate 3-inch by 9-inch exit hole centered at the top of the reduction gearbox, and its output drive gear had fractured.

Metallurgical examination of the fractured pieces of output drive gear revealed features that were consistent with fatigue. The crack initiation site was identified along the outer rim section of the gear, at the root of one of the gear teeth. Even though the crack initiation site was heavily damaged, features indicative of intergranular cracking transitioning to a transgranular fatigue crack propagation were noted. No anomalies or foreign material were noted at the crack origin.

The location and size of the intergranular cracking area was within the carburization layer specified by the manufacturing print. Examination of the remaining output drive gear teeth revealed a total of six additional secondary cracks that were localized around an approximate 22-degree arc near the initial fracture location and located in the same general tooth root location as the initial fatigue fracture. The secondary cracks were examined in detail, revealing the presence of fatigue, plastic deformation, and oxidation near the origins of the cracks, which are clear indications that the cracks initiated and propagated prior to the complete failure of the output drive gear. The existence of multiple fatigue-type cracks implied that the cracking was likely the result of a systematic part anomaly or defect, rather than a localized defect, since no such defect was detected in the fracture surface of the secondary cracks.

The proper material composition, case hardness and depth, and grain structure along with no evidence of a material process issue indicated that the failed output drive shaft was manufactured as intended. Chemical analyses were conducted on the primary and secondary fracture surfaces to determine if any of these detrimental impurity elements were present and in quantities sufficient to cause a weakening of the material and lead to the initiation of the fatigue crack. Hydrogen content on the primary fracture surface was reported as 1 part per million. Hydrogen concentrations of a few parts per million dissolved in the steel could cause hairline cracking and loss of tensile ductility. Since hydrogen could diffuse out of the part easily under certain conditions, there was no way to definitively determine what the hydrogen level at the fracture surface was at the time of the crack initiation; however, the hydrogen concentration level found on the fractured tooth was in the general neighborhood where hydrogen embrittlement could occur. Thus, embrittlement was considered as a possible contributor to the fatigue failure. Embrittlement is a loss of ductility and/or toughness of a material and in steels could take various forms. Embrittlers such a hydrogen, phosphorus, and nitrogen, could be detrimental to the desired mechanical properties and are typically grain boundary embrittlers that produced low energy, intergranular ductile fractures.

Cracks caused by hydrogen embrittlement often originate near or at the surface, usually do not branch, and the crack path could be either transgranular or intergranular and could sometimes change from one plane to the other as it propagated. The output drive gear fatigue crack found on the primary fracture surface was a single crack located at the surface that initially propagated intergranularly then transitioned transgranularly prior to failing in overload. This was consistent with a hydrogen embrittlement induced fatigue crack. Hydrogen uptake could come from a various sources, including the electrochemical plating processes, which the output drive gears experienced three times. In order to prevent hydrogen embrittlement, hydrogen that was picked up during the plating process was driven out by a process called dehydrogenization. Review of the manufacturing production order showed that after each of the three plating operations, the output drive gears was subjected to a dehydrogenization process.

Probable cause

The fatigue fracture of the reduction gearbox output drive gear, which resulted in the loss of power output from the engines to the helicopter rotor blade system and a subsequent forced landing. The fracture of the output drive gear was caused by a fatigue crack that originated in a helical tooth root most likely as a result of hydrogen embrittlement during the manufacturing process.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ERA10TA493
Event ID
20100923X80619
Case number
ERA10TA493
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 19bf3173d60f21c97aa221113b641a8ad4795a79d018641a7bfd4353c8c497dc; retrieved 2026-09-15T15:19:49.592Z.