WPR10FA163 · Cirrus Design Corp SR22
Cirrus Design Corp SR22 · Accident: loss of engine power (total) en route
From Buchanan Field (CCR) to Renton Municipal Airport (RNT)
Event
- NTSB case
- WPR10FA163
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 1 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Cirrus Design Corp SR22
- Aircraft type
- Cirrus SR22
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N224GS
- Operator
- Shane Sullivan
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Buchanan Field (CCR), Concord, CATo Renton Municipal Airport (RNT), Renton, WA
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Loss of engine power (total)
- Also codedOther events the NTSB coded in the sequence, such as a wire strike after a loss of power. Flight Findings uses them for its kinds of event. Glossary
- Tree(s)
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant
- Aircraft › Fluids/miscellaneous hardware
- Personnel issues › Task performance
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The airplane was in cruise flight when the engine lost power. The pilot attempted to reach the nearest airport, but the airplane collided with trees about 2.5 miles short of the runway. Non-volatile memory from the cockpit instruments revealed that the engine power decreased to 1,200 and 1,750 rpms, while the fuel flow reached 30 gallons per hour (the maximum range of the fuel flow sensor). Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies except for the fitting cap on the throttle and metering assembly inlet, which was not installed. The cap was found resting on the cylinder baffle, and there was light blue staining on the crankcase indicating fuel leakage. During a postaccident engine run, the engine operated normally with a substitute cap installed finger tight.
An annual inspection was completed about 11 flight hours prior to the accident, during which three engine cylinders were replaced. Following the cylinder replacement, the fuel system pressures were checked with instrumentation that was plumbed into the system at the throttle and metering assembly. Following the pressure tests, the line where the instrumentation was connected should have been secured with the fitting cap that was found not installed. The manufacturer’s maintenance procedure requires that after the pressure tests are completed the cap be torqued and that a leak check be performed.
Metallurgical examination of the cap showed that if it had been properly torqued it would have remained secure. Therefore, it is likely that the cap was installed finger tight and was not properly torqued when it was reinstalled. During the accident flight, the cap loosened and came off, resulting in a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. There was no logbook entry for the most recent annual inspection, nor had the final items on the annual inspection checklist been completed. The Director of Maintenance for the facility had signed off the work order and returned the airplane to service. The assigned mechanic with inspection authorization indicated that he had not completed the annual inspection on the airplane and that the last maintenance he performed was that noted on the work order and annual inspection checklist. If the final checks had been completed, it is likely that the improperly secured cap would have been found because the fuel leakage would have been evident.
Probable cause
The failure of maintenance personnel to properly secure a fitting cap on the throttle and metering assembly inlet after conducting a fuel system pressure check, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident was the decision by the Director of Maintenance to return the airplane to service without verifying with the assigned inspector that all annual inspection items had been completed.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record WPR10FA163
- Event ID
- 20100319X35533
- Case number
- WPR10FA163
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2010-03-20.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 28539acb07b9b6558d9ba07d3f0da0b84446ddb838e714c42c232fb51084a73a; retrieved 2026-09-13T20:43:47.264Z.