Alaska Airlines Flight 528
Boeing 737-890 · Incident: ground handling event during pushback
From Seattle–Tacoma International Airport (SEA) to Hollywood Burbank/Bob Hope Airport (BUR)
Event
- NTSB case
- WPR09IA065
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Incident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Instrument Meteorological Cond
Boeing 737-890
- Aircraft type
- Boeing 737
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N516AS
- Operator
- Alaska Airlines
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Seattle–Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, WATo Hollywood Burbank/Bob Hope Airport (BUR), Burbank, CA
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Pushback/towing · engine not operating
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Ground handling event
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- None
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service
- Organizational issues › Management
- Personnel issues › Task performance
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
Airline personnel reported that the airplane pushed back from the gate with the auxiliary power unit running. As the push back sequence was completed, two deicing vehicles began deicing operations prior to the flight crew configuring the airplane for deicing. Shortly after, the cabin and flight crew noticed fumes within the cabin and cockpit area. The flight crew instructed the deice crew to discontinue deicing operations and the flight crew performed the smoke removal checklist as the deicing operation stopped. The flight crew started both engines and taxied back to gate N14 where the passengers and flight crew exited the airplane via the jet way. The captain reported that he did not clear the ground deicing crew to start their deicing operations. The driver of the primary deicing vehicle reported that he informed the flight crew of the fluid types, freeze points, and concentrations. He added that there was a lot of "radio chatter" and the bucket operator began deicing operations "after we received no objections" from the flight crew. Company deicing procedures state, in part, "prior to fluid application, Ground Deicing Crew member shall confirm with Flight Crew that the aircraft is configured for deicing." The flight crew gate deicing checklist states that the APU and engine bleed air switches are to be turned off prior to deicing. At the time, the APU and engine bleed air switches were still in the ON position when deicing fluid was sprayed on the airplane. This allowed the fluid to be introduced into the air supply lines leading to the cabin and cockpit.
Probable cause
The failure of the deicing crew to follow company procedures by not receiving confirmation from the flight crew before beginning to deice the airplane.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record WPR09IA065
- Event ID
- 20081224X25658
- Case number
- WPR09IA065
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: bad7d2984c1f08e35b2ab0bb8fdddd9529de0fb1a5b0bccf9d913d625e98429b; retrieved 2026-09-15T10:37:58.935Z.