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American Airlines Unknown aircraft incident

22 Sept 2008 · Peoria, IL, United States

aircraft and SkyWest Airlines aircraft · Incident: near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation during landing

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Narrative check · The NTSB narrative appears to contradict this record's aircraft involved. Values are shown as recorded, not corrected; compare with the narrative.

Event

NTSB case
OPS09IA001
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
Event fatalities
Unknown
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Aircraft 1 · Unknown aircraft

RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From not recordedTo not recorded
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Landing
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
None

Aircraft 2 · Unknown aircraft

RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From not recordedTo not recorded
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Landing
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
None

Cause areas

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

On Monday, September 22, 2008 at 1750 central daylight time, Skywest (SKW) flight 5961, a Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ-200), and American Eagle (EGF) flight 4075, an Embraer ERJ-145 (E145) were cleared to land simultaneously on intersecting runways at the Greater Peoria Regional Airport (PIA) in Peoria, Illinois. The air traffic control tower operator that cleared the two aircraft to land was a position certified developmental controller working local control (LC). EGF4075, number 1 in the landing sequence, on a visual approach to runway 22, rejected the landing clearance stating he was too high and requested a 360 degree turn on final. The LC disapproved the request due to aircraft that were following and directed EGF4075 to enter a right downwind for runway 13. At 1747:45, LC cleared SKW5961, on a visual approach, to land on runway 22 when the flight was four miles from the landing threshold. At 1748:09, LC cleared EGF4075 to land on runway 13 and advised that a regional jet was on a three mile final for runway 22. At 1749:45, SKW5961 was on landing rollout and LC asked if they could hold short of runway 13. The crew advised they could. The LC directed SKW5961 to hold short of runway 13 for landing traffic. SKW5961 did not acknowledge the hold short instructions. Five seconds later SKW5961 transmitted "Well almost, uh, but uh, we're here what do you want us to do". The LC directed SKW5961 to hold short of runway 13, because of landing traffic. SKW 5961 responded; "We're kind of technically on the runway [runway 22] but there's plenty of room for a small plane". SKW5961 had stopped short of runway 22 on runway 13 just past old land and hold short (LAHSO) markings on runway 13. The pilot of SKW5961 assumed the LASHO markings on runway 13 was the hold short point for the intersection of runways 13 and 22. LAHSO is an acronym for "Land and Hold Short Operation." These operations include landing and holding short of an intersecting runway, a taxiway, a predetermined point, or an approach/departure flightpath. A LAHSO hold short point is a point on the runway beyond which a landing aircraft with a LAHSO clearance is not authorized to proceed. This point may be located prior to an intersecting runway, taxiway, predetermined point, or approach/departure flight path. The LAHSO markings on runway 13 are 235 feet from the edge of runway 22. PIA is not a LASHO airport even though LASHO markings are maintained by the airport authority. The PIA air traffic manager, at PIA for approximately one year, was not ware of when PIA ceased LAHSO operations. According to the PIA ATCT Order 7110.1B, Peoria Air Traffic Control (ATC) Facility Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), reference to LAHSO were removed in November 2001. After SKW5961 reported they were technically on runway 22, the LC directed the pilot to hold his position. At 1750:42 LC instructed EGF4075 to exit runway 13 at taxiway M, 1900 feet from the intersection of runway 13 and runway 22, followed shortly thereafter with instructions to SKW5961 to turn right onto runway 31 and turn right onto taxiway M. The LC, stated that he believed that SKW5961 would exit runway 22 at taxiway E and that EGF4075 would fly a longer downwind leg of the traffic pattern. This belief resulted in the LC clearing EGF4075 to land on runway 13 prior to having assured separation between aircraft landing on intersecting runways. When the LC realized that separation would be close, he observed SKW5961 stopped on runway 22 short of runway 13 and believed separation was assured. When SKW5961 advised they were technically on runway 13, the LC considered it safer to allow EGF4075 to land rather direct a go around considering the critical phase of flight EGF4075 was in at the time. The controller-in-charge (CIC) was working combined positions that included ground control, flight data, and clearance delivery and stated that he did not perceive a situation developing that would have resulted in a loss of separation. Per FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 3-10-4, Intersecting Runway Separation: "Issue traffic information to each aircraft operating on intersecting runways. a. Separate an arriving aircraft using one runway from another aircraft using an intersecting runway or a nonintersecting runway when the flight paths intersect by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold or flight path of the other aircraft until one of the following conditions exists: 1. The preceding aircraft has departed and passed the intersection/flight path or is airborne and turning to avert any conflict. 2. A preceding arriving aircraft is clear of the landing runway, completed landing roll and will hold short of the intersection/flight path, or has passed the intersection/flight path." Tower staffing included four controllers: LC, and another controller working ground control, flight data, clearance delivery, and controller-in-charge (CIC) positions combined. Two controllers were on break. The weather at PIA at 1754 was wind 130 at 04 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 6500 feet, broken clouds at 10,000 feet, temperature 27 degrees Celsius, dew point 16 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.26 inches of mercury. Sunset occurred at 1807. The runways were dry.

Probable cause

The tower local controller's failure to provide adequate separation between EGF4075 and SKW5961 that landed on intersecting runways.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record OPS09IA001
Event ID
20081017X61856
Case number
OPS09IA001
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (5)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: a8479fa96c57f3a82de02a3134ee1fe51f53da71331d1191fe8e4a6a7df4cbb7; retrieved 2026-09-13T18:14:28.371Z.
  • The NTSB's operator name is blank for Unknown; the operator shown is the name the NTSB records it doing business as.