NYC08LA091 · North American Rockwell Corp. NA-265-80
North American Rockwell Corp. NA-265-80 · Accident: ground collision while taxiing
From Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE) to Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (BKV)
Narrative check · The NTSB narrative appears to contradict this record's departure or destination. Values are shown as recorded, not corrected; compare with the narrative.
Event
- NTSB case
- NYC08LA091
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
North American Rockwell Corp. NA-265-80
- Aircraft type
- North American Rockwell NA-265
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N3RP
- Operator
- Unknown
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route Narrative disagrees
- From Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Ft. Lauderdale, FLTo Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (BKV), Brookesville, FL
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Taxi · to runway
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Ground collision
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems
- Personnel issues › Task performance
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The Rockwell International Sabreliner had just been released from the repair station following several months of maintenance, primarily for structural corrosion control and repair. According to the pilots, they began to taxi away from the repair station. Initially, the brakes and steering were satisfactory, but then failed. The airplane then contacted several other airplanes and a tug with an airplane in tow, before coming to a stop. The airplane incurred substantial damage as a result of the multiple collisions. Neither crewmember heard or saw any annunciations to alert them to a hydraulic system problem. Postaccident examination revealed that there was no pressure in the normal hydraulic system, as expected, and that the auxiliary system pressure was adequate to facilitate emergency braking. Additional examination and testing revealed that the aural warning for low hydraulic system pressure was inoperative, but all other hydraulic, steering, and braking systems functioned properly. Both the pilot and copilot were type-rated in the Sabreliner, and each had approximately 350 hours of flight time in type. Neither crewmember had any time in Sabreliners in the 90 days prior to the accident. Operation of the emergency braking system in the airplane required switching the system on, waiting for system pressure to decrease to 1,700 pounds per square inch (psi), pulling the "T" handle, and then pumping the brake pedals 3 to 5 times. In addition, the system will not function if both the pilot's and copilot's brake pedals are depressed simultaneously. The investigation did not uncover any evidence to suggest the crew turned on the auxiliary hydraulic system, or waited for the system pressure to decrease to 1,700 psi in their attempt to use the emergency braking system.
Probable cause
The depletion of pressure in the normal hydraulic system for an undetermined reason, and the pilots' failure to properly operate the emergency braking system. Contributing to the accident was an inoperative hydraulic system aural warning.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record NYC08LA091
- Event ID
- 20080330X00398
- Case number
- NYC08LA091
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: e25d873451bc76aed3037f13dd2e14959d81c286aeea40b425714253e7bc1df8; retrieved 2026-09-15T09:28:22.932Z.