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Flight 81 · Beech 1900

17 Dec 2007 · Aniak, AK, United States

Beech 1900 · Incident: hazardous materials leak/spill during takeoff

From Aniak Airport (PANI) to Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport (PANC)

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Event

NTSB case
ANC08IA026
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Charter & commuter
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Beech 1900

Aircraft type
Beechcraft 1900
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N111AX
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Aniak Airport (PANI), Aniak, AKTo Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport (PANC), Anchorage, AK
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Takeoff · roll/run
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Hazardous materials leak/spill
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
None

Cause areas

  • Flightcrew › Loading of cargo, improper

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The flight crew of a cargo airplane had previously loaded a cargo of carbon dioxide cylinders, and then flew to an intermediate airport for fuel. The cylinders had a screw type valve, and a threaded metal safety cap to protect the valve. During the takeoff run after refueling, the crew aborted the takeoff, and taxied back to the airport ramp after hearing a "hissing" sound from the cargo area. Once on the ramp, the captain shut off the engines, but the flight crew lost consciousness before they could exit the airplane. Since the crew filed an IFR flight plan that was not activated, air traffic control personnel contacted the freight office to inquire about the status of the airplane. A freight agent noticed the airplane sitting on the ramp. He opened the door of the airplane, and found the first officer unconscious, inside the door. The captain was unconscious at the controls. He pulled both crewmembers out of the airplane, and ran for help. The flight crew regained consciousness while lying on the ramp, and walked to the freight building. The flight crew were treated at a hospital and released the following day. The first officer reported that as the captain was taxiing back to the airport ramp, he felt the effects of the gas release, and he and the captain opened the cockpit windows. Once stopped, he got up to open the forward door, but collapsed at the door. An FAA inspector examined the airplane, and discovered that the cargo compartment had two tank racks containing five bottles each, standing vertically along each side of the airplane. Two of the cylinders in the left side rack did not have any safety caps installed. Three of the cylinders in the right side rack also did not have any safety caps installed. The caps were found on the floor of the airplane. The inspector found that the middle tank of the three in the right side rack, had a partially open valve. The open tank valve was about 1/2 turn open, and was positioned against the interior side-wall of the cargo compartment. The FAA inspector also indicated that nine carbon dioxide tanks were lying on the floor of the cargo area. They were braced by chocks, but were not strapped down. The crew oxygen masks were not utilized, and the crew oxygen supply tank was full. An FAA Hazardous Materials Division inspector reported that cylinders of carbon dioxide are considered hazardous material because they are pressurized in excess of 40 psi. The inspector noted that the shipper had a responsibility to properly identify and declare hazardous materials that they were shipping, the carrier had a responsibility to properly train airplane crewmembers to identify and accept hazardous materials, and the flight crew had a responsibility to properly secure hazardous materials during transport.

Probable cause

A hazardous leak from carbon dioxide cylinders due to the failure of the flight crew to properly load and secure the cylinders, resulting in crew incapacitation. Factors contributing to the incident were improper hazardous materials procedures used by the shipper, and a failure of the operator to properly train the flight crew in hazardous materials procedures.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ANC08IA026
Event ID
20080116X00059
Case number
ANC08IA026
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 073e848c630420502f641701f510e358c8253ed3fa926f00c52ec5141a52ad49; retrieved 2026-09-18T14:39:38.651Z.