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NYC07IA092 · Cirrus Design Corp. SR20

7 Apr 2007 · Leesburg, VA, United States

Discover Flight Cirrus Design Corp. SR20 · Incident: airframe, component or system failure during takeoff

From Leesburg Executive Airport (JYO) to JYO

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Event

NTSB case
NYC07IA092
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Cirrus Design Corp. SR20

Aircraft type
Cirrus SR20
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N691CD
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Leesburg Executive Airport (JYO), Leesburg, VATo JYO
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Takeoff · roll/run
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Airframe, component or system failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
None

Cause areas

  • Aircraft manuals, procedure information › Inadequate

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

During the beginning of its takeoff roll, the aileron and rudder controls of a Cirrus SR20 jammed when the student pilot applied full right rudder while simultaneously applying full left aileron. No previous control problems had been reported to have occurred since the airplane was delivered new. Review of the incident airplane's maintenance records did not reveal any previous control problems or any re-rigging of its flight control system since delivery. At the time of the incident, the airplane had accumulated 509 total hours in service. Examination of the airplane revealed that with simultaneous full left aileron and full right rudder inputs, the rudder-aileron interconnect (RAI) arm captured the forward RAI bungee clamp, and locked the yaw and roll controls. The airplane was configured in accordance with the existing design, manufacturing and maintenance guidance and procedures. During the investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board was also notified of an occurrence of control interference with another SR-20, and instances of RAI bungee cord slippage through the bungee cord clamps, which could result in increased roll control input forces or adverse effects on the operation of the aileron trim system. Evidence indicated that the existing design and rigging guidance was insufficient to prevent control interference and clamp slippage. The manufacturer issued a mandatory service bulletin which changed the rigging procedures and RAI hardware. During the course of the investigation, the service bulletin was revised three times as safety information was garnered from airplane examinations and bungee testing. The Federal Aviation Administration also issued an airworthiness directive making the changes mandatory.

Probable cause

The airplane manufacturer's inadequate rudder-aileron interconnect rigging information. Contributing to the incident was the design of the rudder-aileron interconnect system.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record NYC07IA092
Event ID
20070427X00464
Case number
NYC07IA092
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 1610526fe72256c2d6dd7b4d52f1da9a6bfad141d2a8c06390c2ebe7ab825fcb; retrieved 2026-09-22T03:55:26.730Z.