LAX07IA093 · Columbia Aircraft LC41-550FG
Columbia Aircraft LC41-550FG · Incident: airframe, component or system failure en route
From General Dick Stout Field (1L8) to French Valley Airport (F70)
Event
- NTSB case
- LAX07IA093
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Incident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Columbia Aircraft LC41-550FG
- Aircraft type
- Columbia LC41
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N194LF
- Operator
- Johnny O. Leach · private individual
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From General Dick Stout Field (1L8), St. George, UTTo French Valley Airport (F70), Murrieta/Temecu, CA
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- None
Cause areas
- Flight control, aileron › Jammed
- Manufacturer › Procedure inadequate
- Miscellaneous, airframe › Foreign material/substance
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The pilot experienced a "check attitude" annunciator warning related to the airplane's autopilot while in cruise flight in his 8-month-old airplane. The pilot responded to the warning by initially cycling the autopilot off and on. He also attempted to correct the increasing left bank of the airplane, but movement of the aileron control stick was restricted. The stick turned to the right but its movement stopped at the center position. The pilot further described the anomaly by stating that "the yoke felt as if it were hitting something very solid." It felt like the yoke "was hitting a metallic stop." Despite his best efforts at applying right aileron roll control inputs (even using both hands), he was not able to move the control stick right of the neutral aileron (wings-level) position. The airplane reached an approximate 90-degree left bank angle before his application of full right rudder control inputs returned it to level flight and he reacquired control. At the time, the pilot was approaching his home base airport, and he decided to land. After two approaches that terminated in go-arounds, the pilot successfully landed and taxied to his hangar. While taxiing, the pilot tried to get the aileron to move freely upon application of stick pressure. Also, after he parked the airplane he tried to move the aileron with his hands. When he moved the stick to the right, it would stop at the neutral position. Before further flight, the airplane and its autopilot systems were examined. No anomalies were found with the autopilot or related systems. Under the Safety Board's directed inquiry, the aileron binding event was confirmed during the FAA's and participants' physical inspection of the right wing's linear bearing, through which the actuating control rod is routed. Manufacturing-related foreign object debris (FOD) was found on the bottom of the inboard side of the linear bearing housing. Previously, reports had been received of flight control binding events, but the manufacturer had failed to so notify the FAA, pursuant to regulations. The manufacturer responded by issuing a mandatory service bulletin, and the FAA responded to the incident by issuing an airworthiness directive to address identification and prevention of similar control binding events.
Probable cause
Jammed aileron flight control during cruise flight due to the presence of foreign object debris, which resulted from the manufacturer's improper processes.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record LAX07IA093
- Event ID
- 20070314X00293
- Case number
- LAX07IA093
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2007-02-14.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 0a740c55aa3b3874badcdfa5f4b303e68d9da08a8e5e7e58356c2343fb3c6e30; retrieved 2026-09-22T04:02:12.923Z.