British Airways Flight BA209

After a normal landing on runway 30, a runway the flightcrew had not previously landed on at night, the flightcrew taxied the airplane to the end of the runway, intending to depart the runway at the last taxiway. The flightcrew passed the taxiway exit, overran the departure threshold of runway 30, and struck two lights associated with the approach lighting system for runway 12, breaking the lights off at their bases. The airplane was not damaged, and, after being towed from the overrun area, taxied to the gate under its own power.

The flightcrew stated to investigators that they observed the runway centerline lights initially alternated red and white and then became all red as they taxied the airplane toward the runway threshold. They stated that they were looking for a right turn to vacate the runway but did not see any green lead-off lights leading to the taxiway. They further stated that they observed a line of red lights about 50 meters (about 160 feet) in front of the airplane, which they thought were part of the stop bar indicating the runway threshold. The first officer started to turn off the runway using the blue taxiway edge lights as a guide, but immediately stopped the airplane when both he and the captain realized the light pattern was not as expected. The investigation revealed that the red lights that the flightcrew observed were obstruction lights mounted on top of an Instrument Landing System localizer antenna, approximately 500 feet beyond the runway threshold. The actual runway threshold was marked with eight red lights, consisting of four lights extending out from each side of the runway edge.

The lighting, signage, and airfield markings of runway 30 were operational and in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications; however, the flightcrew did not correctly utilize or interpret these cues to determine their exact location during taxi. The runway 30 centerline lights changed from all white to alternating red and white lights beginning 3,000 feet from the runway threshold and became all red lights beginning 1,000 feet from the runway threshold. The runway edge lights changed from white to amber 2,000 feet from the runway threshold and remained amber until the end of the runway. On the left side of the runway, "distance remaining" signs were installed at 4,000 feet, 2,000 feet, and 1,000 feet before the runway threshold. Approximately 500 feet before the runway threshold, on the right side of the runway, a taxiway sign was installed, indicating "Q" with an arrow pointing to the right. Approximately 75 feet before the runway threshold, the centerline lights of Taxiway Q began at the runway edge and extended perpendicular to and away from the runway. Additionally, twelve parallel white bars were painted along the width of the runway surface to mark the threshold and yellow chevrons were painted on the blast pad beyond the runway threshold to indicate unusable pavement.

FAA advisory material for new runway threshold lighting installations and for reconstruction of existing installations recommends that threshold lights extend from the runway edge inboard toward the center of the runway, and not outboard like those on the incident runway; however, existing installations, such as those on the incident runway, were permitted by the FAA. The taxiway at the end of the runway did not have taxiway lead off lights extending to the center of the runway, but the taxiway did have centerline lights beginning at the runway edge, per FAA requirements. Although the flightcrew said they were confused by the location of the runway threshold lights, they had numerous other indications available to identify their position on the runway, all of which were in compliance with FAA guidance. Each of these indications would have been visible from the cockpit and are intended to help the flightcrew navigate without incident. However, the flightcrew did not heed the numerous lighting, signage, and airfield markings for runway 30, and instead focused on lights that were located well beyond the runway threshold to the exclusion of all other indications.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset