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US Airways Boeing 737-400 incident

9 Nov 2005 · Fort Lauderdale, FL, United States

Boeing 737-400 · Incident: near collision between aircraft during landing

From Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT) to Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport (FLL)

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Event

NTSB case
OPS06IA001
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Boeing 737-400

Aircraft type
Boeing 737
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
UNKNO WN
Operator
US Airways
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), Pittsburgh, PATo Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, FL
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Landing · aborted
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Near collision between aircraft
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
None

Cause areas

  • Atc personnel(lcl/gnd/clnc) › Monitoring, inadequate
  • Atc personnel(lcl/gnd/clnc) › Traffic advisory, not relayed

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot of Comair flight 5026 (COM26), a Canadair Regional Jet, reported a near-collision with US Airways flight 1251 (USA1251), a Boeing 737-400. At the time of the incident, COM26 was holding in takeoff position on runway 9L, and USA1251 was on approach to runway 9L. USA1251 contacted the Fort Lauderdale (FLL) tower at 2342, and was cleared to land on runway 9L. The local controller advised that there would be several departures before USA1251's arrival, and the pilot acknowledged. At 2342:48, the controller cleared a Southwest flight for takeoff and instructed Comair 716 (COM716) to taxi into position and hold, advising the pilot that there was arrival traffic on 9-mile final. At 2343:52, the controller cleared COM716 for takeoff and instructed COM26 to taxi into position and hold on runway 9L, advising the pilot of COM26 that there was arrival traffic on 4-mile final. At 2344:46, COM716 was instructed to contact departure control. At 2344:52, the controller advised an arriving Gulfstream jet that they were number 2 for the runway, following a 737 on 2-mile final. At 2345:15, the controller began a series of exchanges with a helicopter that was 38 miles from FLL and trying to contact Miami approach control. At 2345:48, USA1251 asked if they were cleared to land; the controller responded, "USA1251 cleared to land runway 9L." Immediately, an unidentified voice on the frequency stated, "Traffic on 9 left." The controller transmitted, "USAir go around, USAir go around, USAir 1251 go around." USA1251 did go around, and, according to recorded radar data, passed about 100 feet above COM26. After USA1251 was given back to Miami approach for resequencing, the flight returned and landed uneventfully. The LCN controller notified the tower supervisor of the incident as soon as it occurred, and she initiated a quality assurance review (QAR) that was logged in the Daily Record of Facility Operation. According to the QAR summary, the supervisor interviewed both the local and ground controllers and reviewed the tape, concluding that there was no loss of separation between USA1251 and COM26 because USA1251 was instructed to go around when approximately one mile from the runway. The pilot of COM26 filed a near midair collision report with FLL tower on the day after the incident. At the time of the incident, the Local Control North (LCN) controller was responsible for both the LCN and Local Control South (LCS) positions, and was therefore required to monitor operations on all runways. The tower is located between runways 9L and 9R, so the LCN controller was therefore required to divide his attention in opposite directions while handling aircraft on both of those runways. Runway 9L is normally used for jet traffic, and runway 9R is normally used for general aviation traffic. While USA1251 was on approach there were multiple departures and arrivals operating on runway 9L, and a Seneca waiting to depart on runway 9R. Neither aircraft was damaged, and there were no reported injuries. Weather conditions at FLL at 2253 UTC were reported as wind 060 at 12 knots, visibility 10 miles, with scattered clouds at 3,500 feet.

Probable cause

the local controller's failure to monitor the operation and recognize a developing traffic conflict which resulted in a loss of separation between USA1251 and ComAir 5026. Contributing to the accident was the controller's incorrect prioritization of his workload.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record OPS06IA001
Event ID
20060217X00213
Case number
OPS06IA001
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 6ee47596efe67000f04de6788f94dd449664551ada77c52a05f34766c028839a; retrieved 2026-09-18T14:57:36.227Z.