CJ Systems Aviation Group Aerospatiale AS365N accident
Aerospatiale AS365N · Accident: airframe, component or system failure while maneuvering
From Porter Regional Hospital Heliport (46II) to University of Chicago Hospitals Heliport (4IS3)
Event
- NTSB case
- CHI05FA192
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Charter & commuter
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Aerospatiale AS365N
- Aircraft type
- Aerospatiale AS365
- Category
- Helicopter
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N365S
- Operator
- CJ Systems Aviation Group
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Porter Regional Hospital Heliport (46II), Valparaiso, INTo University of Chicago Hospitals Heliport (4IS3), Chicago, IL
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Maneuvering · hover in ground effect
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, installation, improper
- Pilot in command › Aircraft control, not possible
- Rotor drive system, tail rotor drive shaft coupling › Loose
- Rotor drive system, tail rotor drive shaft › Failure, total
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The helicopter was substantially damaged when it struck the helipad during an uncommanded yaw encountered during the initial hover after liftoff from a roof-top hospital heliport. The pilot reported that he picked up into a 4 to 6-foot hover and initiated a right pedal turn. He stated that as the helicopter reached a west heading "the aircraft would not turn any more" despite his continued application of right pedal. He stated: "As I continued to apply right pedal the aircraft then went into [a] sudden and uncommanded yaw to the left. I was unable to stop the yaw." The helicopter subsequently impacted the helipad and roof structure. It came to rest at the east edge of the helipad oriented on a southeast heading. A post accident inspection revealed that the Fenestron (tail rotor) drive shaft had failed approximately 6 inches aft of the main gearbox. The failure occurred at the point where the drive shaft entered a tunnel formed by the left and right engine firewalls. The firewalls and drive shaft segments in the vicinity of the point of failure exhibited scrape marks. Examination of the forward section of the drive shaft revealed features characteristic of an overload failure. The main gearbox output shaft assembly and rear transmission coupling connected the tail rotor drive shaft to the gearbox. Further examination revealed that the coupling flange could be moved laterally relative to the pinion approximately 3/32 (0.094) inch. Allowable lateral play in the drive flange was 1 millimeter (0.039 inch). Disassembly of the transmission coupling determined that the nut which secured the drive flange to the output assembly pinion gear was improperly installed. Wear patterns indicated that the locking tangs on the cup washer did not engage the corresponding slots on the shaft allowing the nut to loosen over time. In addition, the condition of the locking tangs indicated that they were folded over during installation causing them to separate from the cup. The resulting wear had removed material to such an extent that the contact face was no longer perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the shaft. This allowed excessive radial play in the transmission coupling, which permitted contact between the tail rotor drive shaft and the firewalls. The FAA Rotorcraft Flying Handbook, FAA-H-8083-21, provided information related to failure of the anti-torque system on a helicopter. The handbook stated: "The loss of antitorque normally results in an immediate yawing of the helicopter's nose. The helicopter yaws to the right in a counter-clockwise rotor system and to the left in a clockwise system. . . . The severity of the yaw is proportionate to the amount of power being used and the airspeed. An antitorque failure with a high power setting at a low airspeed results in a severe yawing." The main rotor system of the accident helicopter rotated clockwise as viewed from above.
Probable cause
The loose tail rotor drive shaft coupling due to its improper installation by the operator's maintenance personnel, which resulted in the failure of the tail rotor drive shaft. An additional cause was the inability of the pilot to maintain control of the helicopter in the hover following the drive shaft failure.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record CHI05FA192
- Event ID
- 20050901X01360
- Case number
- CHI05FA192
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 2fc9419f7ca060aaa11fee99ee5853e9455db3ee97d7e7da08420e7b0511bbb0; retrieved 2026-09-18T15:00:12.256Z.