LAX05LA164 · Robinson R44
Robinson R44 · Accident: loss of control in flight during initial climb
From Los Banos Municipal Airport (LSN) to Los Banos Municipal Airport (LSN)
Event
- NTSB case
- LAX05LA164
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Robinson R44
- Aircraft type
- Robinson R44
- Category
- Helicopter
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N144SM
- Operator
- Unknown
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Los Banos Municipal Airport (LSN), Los Banos, CATo Los Banos Municipal Airport (LSN)
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Initial climb
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Loss of control in flight
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, installation, improper
- Flightcrew › Cyclic, not available
- Rotorcraft flight control, cyclic control rod › Separation
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The helicopter landed hard and rolled over after the nut/bolt assembly connecting the left cyclic push-pull tube to the swashplate came loose, causing a loss of roll control during takeoff. No mechanical anomalies were noted during the preflight. The certificated flight instructor (CFI) and student departed to do training at another airport. During takeoff to return to their home base, the CFI heard a clicking noise coming from the helicopter and decided to make a precautionary landing; however, the helicopter began a roll to the right. The CFI attempted to correct the roll to the right with the application of left cyclic, but there was no corresponding response. The right skid contacted the ground and the helicopter rolled over, coming to rest on its left side. Following the accident, the bolt, nut, and two spacers that connected the left cyclic push-pull tube to the swashplate were located on the runway. When the Federal Aviation Administration inspector arrived, he also walked the accident area and found the self-locking nut. A review of the aircraft logbook indicated that the left rib at the top of the mast fairing had been installed at the last 100-hour inspection, 2.5 hours before the accident. In order to remove the left rib (bulkhead), the bolt and nut assembly that attaches the left cyclic push-pull tube to the left lug of the non-rotating swashplate had to be disassembled, and then reassembled after the rib (bulkhead) replacement. According to the manufacturer's Illustrated Parts Catalog, left cyclic push-pull tube connection to the non-rotating swashplate assembly requires a bolt and self-locking nut, 3 spacers (2 of the 3 spacers were found at the accident site), a washer, and a locking palnut, were not found. A metallurgical examination of the swashplate assembly, left push-pull tube, left rib (bulkhead), nut and bolt and associated hardware was conducted. All of the fracture surfaces examined revealed no preexisting damage. The absence of the bolt between the left cyclic push-pull tube and the non-rotating swashplate after the accident and the thread imprints within the hole of the left lug of the non-rotating swashplate indicated that the bolt had been backing out of the hole over time. The bolt and nut that were recovered were in good condition, and the hole in the left lug of the non-rotating swashplate was not significantly ovalized, indicating that the bolted connection was not subjected to excessive loads of any kind. The loss of the nut (and subsequent backing out of the bolt) indicates that the connection was not properly assembled following the recent maintenance, which required the bolted connection to be disassembled.
Probable cause
the improper installation of the nut/bolt assembly connecting the left cyclic push-pull tube to the non-rotating swashplate by maintenance personnel, which led to a loss of roll control during takeoff.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record LAX05LA164
- Event ID
- 20050525X00675
- Case number
- LAX05LA164
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: a80c05fb19641f330fa20cdbe3819e869f91cdf1ead6039d0710043872b1c14a; retrieved 2026-09-22T05:56:42.950Z.