MIA05LA049 · Beech B300

The pilot obtained three preflight weather briefings for the accident flight. The first weather briefing was the evening before the flight, while the last two were obtained the morning of the accident flight. The accident flight departed and ATIS information was obtained when the flight was approximately 30 miles from the destination airport. The ATIS at that time indicated scattered clouds existed at 100 feet with 2 miles visibility. The flight continued and after passing the final approach fix during the ILS approach to runway 32, the tower controller advised the flight crew of an indefinite ceiling of 100 feet with 3/4 mile visibility, with the visibility being supplemented by the ground controller who is a National Weather Service train weather observer, from the previous weather observation taken at 0807. The audible alarm for the ASOS monitor was on at the time of the accident. The ASOS monitor was located due east from the center of the tower cab near the ground control position, while the local control position was located north-northwest from the center of the tower cab. At 0826, a special METAR weather observation was taken indicating the visibility was 1/4 statute mile with fog, and a vertical visibility was 100 feet; the special observation was not provided to the flight crew. At the time the special METAR was taken, the airplane was inside the final approach fix and at an altitude less than 459 feet above ground level. The pilot advised he was flying the airplane at Vref plus 4 knots, and both he and copilot reported the runway environment became visible when the flight was approximately 200 feet agl. During the flare for landing, the flight entered heavy fog. The pilot further reported that he could not determine the point of touchdown; however, while on the ground, the airplane passed the 1000 foot-remaining marker. Full braking and reverse was applied; however, the airplane traveled off the end of the runway onto wet grass and collided with a localizer antenna 557 feet past the departure end of the runway. The pilot further reported there was no preimpact failure or malfunction of the aircraft, aircraft systems, or engines. He also reported that the reason for the overrun was not due to the additional 4 knots, but was due to the fact that while flaring to land with the engines spool down, full flaps extended, and the indicated airspeed below Vmc, fog rolled over the runway severely limiting my view of it. As a result he had to "... feel for the runway" which extended the touchdown point resulting in insufficient runway to stop.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset