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LAX04IA311 · Sikorsky S-70A

30 Aug 2004 · Pacoima, CA, United States

Sikorsky S-70A · Incident: total loss of engine power (mechanical failure) en route

From Pacoima, CA to Palmdale Regional Airport / USAF Plant 42 Airport (PMD)

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Event

NTSB case
LAX04IA311
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Sikorsky S-70A

Aircraft type
Sikorsky S-70
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N160LA
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Pacoima, CATo Palmdale Regional Airport / USAF Plant 42 Airport (PMD), Palmdale, CA
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · cruise
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Total loss of engine power (mechanical failure)
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Minor

Cause areas

  • Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, replacement, improper
  • Turbine assembly, air seal › Not installed
  • Turboshaft engine, gas generator turbine › Failure, total

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The twin-engine helicopter's number 2 engine experienced an uncontained engine failure and liberated debris punctured the helicopter's firewall while in cruise flight. The pilot made an uneventful landing at a nearby airport. Examination of the engine revealed segments of the stage 2 aft cooling plate (S2ACP) exited the power turbine case. Further investigation determined that the gas generator rotor's forward curvic seal was not installed during the operator's replacement of the gas generator turbine (GGT) module 92 hours prior to the event. Manufacturer's analysis of the missing curvic seal revealed it would have caused the reversal of the secondary airflow in the B-sump, which eventually led to auto ignition of the B-sump oil and exposure of the B-sump hardware to elevated temperatures. The elevated temperatures resulted in the separation of several B-sump components, including the separation of the compressor shaft. The compressor shaft separation resulted in the GGT rotor to rub into the stator and extensive secondary damage, including the separation of the S2ACP. The GGT module was replaced 209 hours prior to the event. According to the manufacturer, the forward curvic seal is part of the engine assembly rather than part of either the GGT rotor assembly or the high pressure compressor rotor assembly. According to General Electric (GE), if the curvic seal was removed from the engine during removal of the previous GGT rotor-stator assembly, and either discarded, or returned to GE's service facility with the rotor, a new seal would not have been included with the new GGT rotor-stator assembly, and the GGT could have been reinstalled without it. The manufacturer also reported that the maintenance manuals did not call for the verification of curvic seal installation during GGT replacement. This military engine was not a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certificated engine, but did share similar design features of other FAA certificated engines. The manufacturer reported that the civilian certificated engine maintenance manuals do call for the verification of curvic seal installation following a GGT replacement. The engine was removed from the event helicopter 92 hours prior to the event and was shipped to an engine service center for an internal leak at the number 3 labyrinth seal (located in the front frame of the engine). The service center repaired the inlet guide vanes, which, according to the manufacturer, was a typical repair when oil is observed leaking in the flow path in front of the compressor. However, their analysis of the missing curvic seal indicates that it too would have resulted in an oil leak in the front frame.

Probable cause

the failure of the operator's mechanics to install the turboshaft engine's forward curvic seal during a gas generator turbine (GGT) replacement. Contributing factors to the incident were the failure of the manufacturer to provide a forward curvic seal with the replacement GGT, and the lack of a curvic seal installation verification inspection in the maintenance manuals following the GGT installation.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record LAX04IA311
Event ID
20040929X01532
Case number
LAX04IA311
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 9621f34819fe8be598819ac30de84ef68350905384f44d35e4793868c64b9135; retrieved 2026-09-22T06:48:58.122Z.