NYC04FA170 · Piper PA-32R-301T

While executing an ILS approach in night instrument meteorological conditions, the approach controller instructed the pilot that radar services were terminated, and to switch to the advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged the instruction, and no further transmissions were received from the airplane. Review of radar data revealed that the airplane intercepted the final approach course for the runway 3 localizer, where it began a gradual descent. About 4 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was recorded on the localizer course, at a ground speed of 115 knots; however, radar coverage was subsequently lost. The airplane impacted a wooded area about 1/2 mile west of the runway, approximately abeam the 500-foot markers painted on the runway surface. The wreckage path was oriented approximately 90 degrees left of the inbound approach heading. A postcrash fire consumed the main wreckage. The weather reported at the airport, about 7 minutes prior to the accident, included 2-1/2 statute miles of visibility; mist; few clouds at 200 feet agl, and an overcast cloud layer at 1,800 feet agl. The weather reported at the airport, about 1 minute after the accident, included 3/4 statute miles of visibility; mist; scattered clouds at 200 and 500 feet agl, an overcast cloud layer at 1,800 feet agl. Review of the instrument approach procedure revealed that the minimums for the straight in approach were 3/4 statute miles of visibility, and a decision altitude of 250 feet agl. The missed approach procedure was, climb to 3,000 feet, direct to a VOR located about 6.7 miles northeast of the airport, and hold.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset