CHI04CA090 · Schleicher ASW-20
Schleicher ASW-20 · Accident: airframe, component or system failure during initial climb
From Sunflower Aerodrome Gliderport (SN76) to Sunflower Aerodrome Gliderport (SN76)
Event
- NTSB case
- CHI04CA090
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Schleicher ASW-20
- Aircraft type
- Schleicher ASW-20
- Category
- Glider
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N232EM
- Operator
- Unknown
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Sunflower Aerodrome Gliderport (SN76), Yoder, KSTo Sunflower Aerodrome Gliderport (SN76), Yoder, KS
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Initial climb
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Flt control syst, elevator control › Disengaged
- Flt control syst, elevator control › Not safetied
- Pilot in command › Aircraft preflight, inadequate
- Pilot in command › Procedures/directives, not complied with
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The experimental sailplane impacted an agricultural field after losing elevator control during initial climb on an aero-tow. Post accident examination of the elevator control system revealed the elevator Louis L'Hotellier ball and swivel joint had become disengaged, which resulted in the loss of elevator control. The Louis L'Hotellier fitting consists of a ball and swivel joint that connects the elevator control rod to the control surface. The purpose of the fitting is to allow the quick disassembly and reassembly of a sailplane. Several airworthiness directives (AD) have been issued for Louis L'Hotellier type fittings in order to "prevent the connectors from becoming inadvertently disconnected, which could result in loss of control of the sailplane or glider." The AD requires the lock plates to be secured either by a safety pin, wire, or other approved method. One specific AD further requires the installation of a placard that states, "All L'Hotellier control system connectors must be secured with safety wire, pins, or safety sleeves, as applicable, prior to operation." According to the pilot, he did not install a safety pin or wire on the elevator fitting prior to the accident flight. Additionally, he reported the sailplane was not equipped with the placard requiring a securing device to be used. The pilot was the owner of the sailplane. The pilot reported completing a "positive control check... although a second person was not available to help." The recognized method of performing a positive control check involves two individuals; one to hold the control surface stationary, while the other individual attempts to move the control stick.
Probable cause
The pilot's failure to secure the elevator Louis L'Hotellier connector with a safety pin or wire as directed in several airworthiness directives and his inadequate preflight inspection of the sailplane, both of which resulted in the in-flight loss of elevator control due to the inadvertent disengagement of the elevator Louis L'Hotellier connector.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record CHI04CA090
- Event ID
- 20040402X00417
- Case number
- CHI04CA090
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 86b52d105bf4c07922bb78ab6e94bc3c5c99667217705670756e2f5979b71e0a; retrieved 2026-09-22T07:48:19.975Z.