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FTW04FA006 · Twin Commander Acft. Corp. 680FL

8 Oct 2003 · Harrison, AR, United States

Twin Commander Acft. Corp. 680FL · Accident: total loss of engine power (non-mechanical) on approach

From Springdale Municipal Airport (ASG) to Boone County Airport (HRO)

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Event

NTSB case
FTW04FA006
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Twin Commander Acft. Corp. 680FL

Aircraft type
Twin Commander 680
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N680WS
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Springdale Municipal Airport (ASG), Springdale, ARTo Boone County Airport (HRO), Harrison, AR
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach · VFR pattern final
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Total loss of engine power (non-mechanical)
Also codedOther events the NTSB coded in the sequence, such as a wire strike after a loss of power. Flight Findings uses them for its kinds of event. Glossary
Fuel starvation; Tree(s)
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

  • Fluid, fuel › Starvation
  • Pilot in command › Procedures/directives, not performed

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The twin-engine airplane was on the base leg to final turn, about 1-1 1/2 miles from the approach end of the runway when the left engine lost power. Instantly after, the right engine lost power and the pilot feathered both engines. The airplane then impacted a 70-foot high tree and collided with the ground about 1,000 feet short of the runway. The 700-hour pilot reported that he activated the electric fuel boost pumps and switched the fuel selectors from the auxiliary fuel tank positions to the main fuel tank positions, about 17 miles from the airport. He recalled that the fuel gauges indicated approximately 70 gallons of fuel in the main tank and about 10-15 gallons of fuel in the auxiliary tanks. The original installed fuel system was configured with a center tank and two outboard tanks. The center tank was composed of five, interconnected rubber cells, having a total capacity of 150 to 159 US gallons. Each outboard fuel tank was composed of two fuel cells with a combined capacity of 33.5 gallons. The total of the two outboard fuel tanks (four cells) was 67 gallons, providing a total usable capacity of 233 gallons. Each engine had its own fuel shutoff switch. Rotating a switch to the RIGHT OUTBOARD or LEFT OUTBOARD position allows fuel from the outboard tanks to flow to the respective engine and shuts off fuel from the center tank. Rotating a fuel shutoff switch to the CENTER position allows fuel to flow from the center tank to the respective engine, and shuts off flow from the respective outboard tank. Rotating the switch to the OFF position shuts off all fuel flow to the respective engine. There was no cross-feed configuration of the switches. Documentation was found in the historical records that indicated extended range fuel system modifications, however, the information was incomplete. After review of all available records and examination of the wreckage, it was determined that the fuel system configuration/capacity of the airplane at the time of the accident was: 156 gallons for the center tank system; 67 gallons for the outboard wing tanks; and a set of auxiliary tanks capable of holding 21 gallons (records of installation unknown). The total usable fuel capacity was estimated at 244 gallons. Cockpit fuel selector positions were: LEFT Fuel Shut Off Valve Selector-LEFT HAND OUTBOARD; LEFT Fuel Boost Pump-OFF; LEFT Engine Primer-OFF; LEFT Ignition Switch-RIGHT; RIGHT Fuel Shut Off Valve Selector-RIGHT HAND OUTBOARD; RIGHT Fuel Boost Pump-ON; RIGHT Engine Primer-OFF; RIGHT Ignition Switch-BOTH. Airframe fuel shutoff valves were found in the following positions (Each valve position corresponded to the cockpit selectors): Right Wing Auxiliary-OPEN; Right Wing Main-CLOSED; Left Wing Auxiliary-OPEN; Left Wing Main-CLOSED. A total of 37.5 gallons of usable fuel was drained from the uncompromised tanks (unknown amount had leaked at the accident site). Excerpts from the " Normal Procedures" section of the flight manual regarding fuel selector positions for take off and landing: "CAUTION; Burn center tank fuel first, when 100 gallons is shown on center tank gauge, switch to outboard tanks. Do not allow engine to be starved of fuel when outboard tanks run dry. Select center tanks at first indication of fuel pressure loss. Fuel boost pumps must be on when switching tanks." The "BEFORE LANDING CHECK" procedures in the aircraft flight manual state that the Fuel Selector Valves must be in the "CENTER TANK" position before the approach. The manufacturer stated that the simultaneous loss of power of both engines was likely a result of the outboard fuel tanks unporting. No mechanical anomalies were found during examination of the engines or airframe, and usable fuel was available in the center tank at the time of the accident.

Probable cause

The loss of power to both engines due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot's failure to complete the landing checklist while on final approach. A factor contributing to the accident was the lack of suitable terrain for the forced landing.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record FTW04FA006
Event ID
20031017X01767
Case number
FTW04FA006
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: e2f1e7862fecd19b6c8794358789101160b0a93ae89f342b02d3480ba06ee63a; retrieved 2026-09-21T09:22:10.158Z.