FLIGHT FINDINGSAVIATION OCCURRENCE MAP
Back to map

DEN02LA109 · Sabian Rans S-12XL

22 Sept 2002 · Mexican Hat, UT, United States

Sabian Rans S-12XL · Accident: loss of control in flight during an uncontrolled descent

From Blanding Municipal Airport (BDG) to Val Air Airport (CD82)

Report a problem

Event

NTSB case
DEN02LA109
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
2 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Sabian Rans S-12XL

Aircraft type
Sabian RANS S-12XL
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N725ST
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Blanding Municipal Airport (BDG), Blanding, UTTo Val Air Airport (CD82), Durango, CO
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Uncontrolled descent
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Loss of control in flight
Also codedOther events the NTSB coded in the sequence, such as a wire strike after a loss of power. Flight Findings uses them for its kinds of event. Glossary
Stall/mush
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

  • Pilot in command › Airspeed, inadequate
  • Pilot in command › Emergency procedure, not followed
  • Pilot in command › In-flight planning/decision, inadequate

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot flew up the canyon, looking for a campsite for a future trip. Witnesses observed the aircraft make a "tight" U-turn in the canyon, and then deploy a parachute. The parachute separated from the airplane, and the airplane free fell, impacting the terrain. Witnesses heard the engine running, all the way to impact. A postimpact fire consumed the airplane. The Ballistic Recovery System (BRS), installed on this airplane was a BRS VLS (Vertical Launch System) 1200 model. The system contained a warning label that states "Aircraft Engine Must Be Shut Off Prior to Deploying Parachute. Failure to Do So May Result in Death or Serious Injury." The BRS unit was shipped to the pilot on August 9, 2002; he performed the installation. An examination of the airplane showed the two carabineers next to each other in the airplane wreckage. If the BRS system had been assembled properly, they should have been approximately 10 feet apart. The 14 foot 11-3/4 inch riser was found cut at one end. The other end was still attached to the suspension lines of the parachute. Approximately 4 feet of the riser was consumed by fire. The physical evidence revealed that the protective Kevlar bridle (resistant to propeller slashes) had been inadvertently removed from the BRS system during installation.

Probable cause

the pilot's inadequate in-flight planning and decision making (flying up a canyon with insufficient altitude) which resulted in an inadvertent stall/mush, and the pilot's failure to follow the proper emergency procedures for activating his Ballistic Recovery System (shutting off his pusher engine before deploying the BRS parachute). Contributing factors were the improper installation of the BRS by the pilot which led to the subsequent severing of the parachute line by his propeller during deployment.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record DEN02LA109
Event ID
20020926X05216
Case number
DEN02LA109
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 3a5d231d2b2a2d1ad3ec349e5ada0912796d5367a6d74dae2a08e1362d2dfc9e; retrieved 2026-09-20T19:47:05.076Z.