Comair Bombardier CL600-2B19 incident
Bombardier CL600-2B19 · Incident: airframe, component or system failure en route
From Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG) to Eppley Airfield (OMA)
Event
- NTSB case
- NYC02IA097
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Incident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Instrument Meteorological Cond
Bombardier CL600-2B19
- Aircraft type
- Bombardier CL600
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N709CA
- Operator
- Comair
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Covington, KYTo Eppley Airfield (OMA), Omaha, NE
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- None
Cause areas
- Manufacturer › Maintenance, inspection, not required
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The Bombardier CL600-2B19 regional jet experienced aileron control stiffness during cruise flight. The airplane was pushed back during a period of moderate to heavy rain. After pushback, the airplane was held on the taxiway for about 30 minutes while the rain continued. Takeoff also occurred during a period of heavy rain. After leveling off at flight level 280, while in cruise flight, the "AP TRIM IS LWD" caution annunciator illuminated. The first officer disconnected the autopilot, and found the aileron controls to be "stiff and binding." The captain then took control of the airplane, and also found the aileron controls to be stiff and binding. The captain applied "light to moderate" roll input and felt a snap. Aileron control then operated normally. The captain executed left and right turns with no additional problems or binding noted. The crew re-engaged the autopilot, and the flight continued to an uneventful landing. On the same date, two other CL600 regional jets from the same airline also experienced aileron stiffness after taking off at the same airport and in similar weather conditions. Both airplanes landed uneventfully. One of the airplanes diverted to an alternate airport. The investigation revealed that approximately 40 Bombardier CRJ CL-600-2B19 regional jets experienced in-flight aileron control stiffness after standing/taxiing in, or taking off during rainy conditions, then climbing to freezing temperatures. When the jets descended to above-freezing temperatures, the aileron control stiffness ceased. Testing revealed that aileron circuit binding occurred in the area of the Brake and Position Sensor Unit (BPSU) bay. Typically, within the bay, horizontally-oriented pulleys in the aileron control circuit would seize, and the aileron cable, after being subjected to water soaking, would freeze to the pulley. Water ingress to the bay most likely occurred via an aging self-contouring sealing pad on an access panel directly above the pulleys. The horizontal orientation of the pulleys, which had been used without difficulty in transport category aircraft for over 20 years, and the dished cross section of the pulley face allowed the retention of water when the airplane was parked. In addition, the drying of pulley grease over time, combined with water migration from rain, could temporarily allow the bearing to seize when the airplane reached altitude. A test on a dry-bearing pulley revealed that when water was applied to the pulley face, it remained pooled until the pulley was moved, when it flowed into the bearing. Prior to the incidents, the manufacturer had not issued specific instructions to inspect pulleys in the BPSU bay. Subsequent service letters and airworthiness directives to inspect the pulleys, grease the aileron cables and replace aging and seized pulleys, resulted in over 60 seized and deteriorating pulleys being found fleet wide. There have been no further aileron control stiffness events on aircraft which had undergone the new inspection/maintenance procedures.
Probable cause
The manufacturer's failure to provide inspection criteria for the BPSU compartment aileron control pulleys, which resulted in eventual pulley corrosion, and subsequent control stiffness when seized pulleys and water-soaked aileron cables froze together at altitude. Factors included leaking BPSU bay access panel seals, precipitation, and freezing temperatures.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record NYC02IA097
- Event ID
- 20020523X00725
- Case number
- NYC02IA097
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (5)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: a390fb38ef3388c1c8984f92a68c6187f7b3deab342bcb3b78ef4694af5c87d2; retrieved 2026-09-18T16:03:09.393Z.
- The NTSB's operator name is blank for N709CA; the operator shown is the name the NTSB's other records give its FAA operator code, COMA.