NYC00LA021 · Eurocopter AS-350-BA
Eurocopter AS-350-BA · Accident: airframe, component or system failure en route
From Republic Airport (FRG) to East 34th Street Heliport (6N5)
Event
- NTSB case
- NYC00LA021
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Eurocopter AS-350-BA
- Aircraft type
- Eurocopter AS-350
- Category
- Helicopter
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N350SL
- Operator
- Unknown
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Republic Airport (FRG), Farmingdale, NYTo East 34th Street Heliport (6N5), NEW YORK, NY
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Company/operator management › Improper initial training
- Rotor system, tail rotor hub pitch change mechanism › Failure, partial
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
While in cruise flight, the pilot detected a severe vibration and initially elected to return to his departure airport, and then elected to perform a precautionary landing. When the pilot brought the helicopter to a hover, the helicopter rotated nose left. The pilot then landed, shut down the engine, and noticed the tail rotor gear box and vertical fin had separated from the helicopter. One of the tail rotor pitch link control rods was found to have failed. Metallurgical examination of the failed components, found evidence of fatigue on the failed tail rotor pitch link control rod. The manufacturer specified an after last flight of the day (ALF) inspection, as a detailed inspection of the helicopter that could be performed by pilots or maintenance personnel. The Director of Maintenance for the operator reported pilots were responsible for all daily checks. The pilot had not been trained to conduct this inspection, and the FAA check airman who conducted the pilot's initial FAR 135 checkride was not aware of the specifics of the ALF inspection. In addition, the checklist found in the helicopter had not been updated with the latest, more detailed ALF inspection.
Probable cause
the failure of the operator to ensure the pilot was adequately trained to conduct all inspections required by the flight manual, which resulted in the pilot's inadequate preflight and subsequent failure of the tail rotor pitch change rod. Factors were the inadequate preflight by the pilot, and the failure of the FAA to detect the deficiency in the pilot's training, and ensure that the operator used the most current checklist available.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record NYC00LA021
- Event ID
- 20001212X20041
- Case number
- NYC00LA021
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 61bbda3e6d3f00a70c8ab399ceae6b7477da0cb4904d644df5732c587e992f2a; retrieved 2026-09-22T13:47:25.175Z.