LAX92LA225 · Schempp-Hirth VENTUS A/16.6 VENTUS A/1
Schempp-Hirth VENTUS A/16.6 VENTUS A/1 · Accident: airframe, component or system failure en route
From No airport to No airport
Event
- NTSB case
- LAX92LA225
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Schempp-Hirth VENTUS A/16.6 VENTUS A/1
- Aircraft type
- Schempp Hirth VENTUS A 16 6
- Category
- Glider
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N8KS
- Operator
- Roy S. Cundiff · private individual
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From No airportTo No airport
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Destroyed
Cause areas
- Flt control syst, aileron control cable/rod › Disconnected
- Manufacturer › Acft/equip, inadequate aircraft manuals
- Pilot in command › Information unavailable
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
AFTER 4.2 HOURS OF FLIGHT WHILE CRUISING AT 8,000 FT, THE RIGHT AILERON CONTROL SYSTEM 'OTELLIER FITTING DISCONNECTED. THE PILOT SAID THAT THE AILERON TRAIL POSITION IN THE AIRSTREAM CAUSED THE GLIDER TO ENTER A SPIRAL DIVE TO THE RIGHT WHICH COULD NOT BE STOPPED BY LEFT AILERON OR RUDDER. THE PILOT BAILED OUT ABOUT 1,000 FT AGL. THE GLIDER WAS ASSEMBLED ON 5/30/92 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLT & MAINT MANUAL. THE GLIDER WAS THEN FLOWN FOR 4.6 HRS & PARKED OVERNIGHT. THE PILOT SAID HE LUBED THE MALE BALL FITTING PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY AS INSTRUCTED IN THE MANUAL & CLEANED & LUBED THE SLIDE LOCK PLATE WITH WD-40. THE FITTING MANUFACTURERS SAFETY MAINT INFO (NOT AVAILABLE TO PILOTS) REQUIRES THE BALL & SOCKET FITTINGS TO BE LUBED AT EACH ASSEMLBY, BUT CAUTION AGAINST ALLOWING LUBRICANTS ON THE SLIDE LOCK PLATE BECAUSE THE SLIDE 'MAY LOOSE ITS NONREVERSIBILITY' & CAUSE THE FITTING TO DISCONNECT. THE GLIDER MAINT AND FLT MANUAL DOES NOT CAUTION AGAINST LUBRICANTS ON THE SLIDE LOCK PLATE.
Probable cause
THE INFLIGHT DISCONNECTION OF THE RIGHT AILERON 'OTELLIER COUPLER FITTING DUE TO LUBRICANTS ON THE COUPLER SLIDE LOCK PLATE, AND THE FAILURE OF THE GLIDER MANUFACTURER TO INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONARY INFORMATION IN THE MAINTENANCE AND/OR FLIGHT MANUAL. FACTORS IN THE ACCIDENT WERE: THE FAILURE OF THE GLIDER AND FITTING MANUFACTURERS TO MANDATE FAIL/SAFE DEVICES FOR THE COUPLER FITTING, AND THE DESIGN OF THE GLIDER REGARDING THE FACILITATION OF THE COUPLER CONNECTIONS DURING THE GLIDER ASSEMBLY PROCESS.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record LAX92LA225
- Event ID
- 20001211X14695
- Case number
- LAX92LA225
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 76351488bcc359d6f52b70e01a05ade4dc16f73562a0484d8fdbaf01f153a544; retrieved 2026-09-21T14:57:57.289Z.