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UPS Airline Flight 774

11 Sept 1998 · Houston, TX, United States

Boeing 767-34AF · Accident: in flight encounter with weather on approach

From Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport (SDF) to Ellington Airport (EFD)

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Event

NTSB case
FTW98FA380
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Instrument Meteorological Cond

Boeing 767-34AF

Aircraft type
Boeing 767
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N316UP
Operator
UPS Airline
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport (SDF), Louisville, KYTo Ellington Airport (EFD), Houston, TX
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach · IFR final approach
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
In flight encounter with weather
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Flightcrew › Directional control, not maintained
  • Flightcrew › Weather evaluation, misjudged

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The night cargo flight was dispatched from the company's main hub into a known area of potentially severe weather, which was influenced by a stationary front and Tropical Storm "Frances." The terminal forecast provided by the operator to their flight crew was 2-days old. The flight crew was not properly briefed on the forecasted weather conditions for the destination airport, and were not provided with all of the adverse weather information and NOTAMS affecting their route of flight and their destination airport. The flight crew missed the first approach to runway 17R due to strong crosswinds. The flight was subsequently vectored for a Category 1 ILS approach to runway 35L. Level 4 to 5 convective activity with tops to 42,000 feet were present over the destination airport at the time of the mishap. The flight crew configured the airplane for an "autoland" approach with the auto-brakes set for maximum braking. A strong crosswind to a quartering tailwind prevailed during the flight's final approach and landing. The airplane touched down 17-feet left of the centerline of the 9,000-foot long ungrooved concrete runway, which was reported to be partly flooded due to its low crown. The auto-pilot was never disconnected by the flight crew and no attempt was made by the flight crew to abort the landing during the accident sequence. The tower had previously reported standing water a the intersection of runway 17R and taxiway Delta during the first approach. The investigation revealed that the runway condition check was conducted by driving a vehicle over the runway centerline for the full length of the runway. The investigation team was on the runway when another torrential rain shower moved across the airport. The team was able to observe a rapid manifestation of water pooling on the runway, mostly away from the centerline. The depth of the water pooling was measured to be at least 7- inches. The investigation team concluded that the issued "standing water" report failed to indicate the severity of the amount of water actually flooding the runway. Heavy rain showers, sometimes described as "torrential" prevailed throughout the area at the time of the accident. Another weather station, located 29 miles to the southeast, reported 7.64 inches of rain from the tropical storm. Witnesses reported the airplane produced a "heavy rooster tail of water" as soon as it touched down on runway 35L. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting personnel that responded to the accident site, reported that despite the location of their fire house, approximately 1/4-mile across the ramp from the resting place of the airplane, the aircraft was not visible due to the heavy rain that prevailed at the time of the mishap. Some of the first responders reported that "it was raining sideways" at the time of the mishap. Tire marks, similar to "steam cleaning" were found on the concrete surface of the runway, from the touchdown point to the point where the airplane exited the left side of the 150-foot wide runway, were consistent with the tires being in a state of hydroplaning. Nose wheel steering was found to be operational during the landing sequence. Main tire pressures were found to be within inflation limits (185 to 200 PSI). Two of the main tires (no. 3 and no. 7) were damaged and deflated during the accident sequence. One tire showed some discoloration (bluing). On-board avionics test equipment did not record any faults with the autoland system during the accident flight. Examination and bench testing of the eight brake assemblies did not reveal any anomalies. The eight wheel transducers were also tested by the manufacturer and were found to be within limits. The anti-skid/auto-brake control unit was also tested and found fully functional. Flight data recorder data, as well as tire prints made by the nose wheel tire on the runway revealed that the inter-connect between the rudder and the nose wheel assembly attempted to steer the aircraft toward the localizer course. All navigational aids associated with the instrument approach were reported as operating normal during the two approaches. There was sufficient fuel on board to proceed to the alternate airport.

Probable cause

The flight crew's decision to land with convective activity over the airport with a prevailing crosswind to a quartering tailwind, on an ungrooved, flooded runway, which resulted in hydroplaning and a loss of directional control. Factors contributing to the accident were: prevailing dark night conditions; severe weather conditions associated with a major tropical storm, such as convective activity, strong crosswinds, the quartering tailwind, and torrential rain. Also contributing to the accident were the operator's failure to provide the flight crew with up-to-date weather forecasts, in-flight weather advisories, and pertinent NOTAMS relating to the safe operation of the flight.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record FTW98FA380
Event ID
20001211X11043
Case number
FTW98FA380
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (5)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 015e80a7bf567271982bf5f6d952b11c641344165a73b2e010b0fddd7542a61c; retrieved 2026-09-18T17:05:10.359Z.
  • The NTSB's operator name is blank for N316UP; the operator shown is the name the NTSB records it doing business as.